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ARTICLES
CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING ON LABOR AND
CAPITAL: SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR LABOR
LAW
KEN MATHENY*
I. THE CRISIS OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW
In 2007, 15.7 million Americans, 12.1 percent of employed wage and
salary workers, belonged to labor unions. This reflects a sharp decline
from 1983, when unionized workers comprised 20.1 percent of the
workforce. I In the private sector, only 7.5 percent of workers belonged to a
union.2 The tiny percentage of unionized private sector workers is
remarkable in light of empirical data indicating that approximately forty-
four percent of private sector employees would like to be represented by a
* Attorney Advisor, Social Security Administration. B.A. West Va. Wesleyan College; M.A., West
Va. University; J.D., West Virginia University. The views expressed are those of the author and do not
represent the views of the Social Security Administration or the federal government.
I Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Union Members Summary, http://www.bls.gov/
news.release/union2.nrO.htm (Jan. 25, 2008). 1983 is the first year for which comparable union data are
available. Id.
2 Id.
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union.3 Moreover, a majority of American workers would like to be
represented by an organization that has independent authority from
management. 4 The frustrated desires of millions of American workers
compel the conclusion that American labor law has failed, and failed badly.
Millions of American workers are denied the right to union representation
because of a legal regime that is weak and ineffective. A recent
investigation of workers' freedom of association in the United States by
Human Rights Watch concluded that:
[M]illions of workers are excluded from coverage by laws to protect
rights of organizing, bargaining, and striking. For workers who are
covered by such laws, recourse for labor rights violations is often
delayed to a point where it ceases to provide redress. When they are
applied, remedies are weak and often ineffective. In a system replete
with all the appearance of legality and due process, workers' exercise
of rights to organize, to bargain, and to strike in the United States have
been frustrated by many employers who realize that they have little to
fear from labor law enforcement through a ponderous, delay-ridden
legal system with meager remedial powers. 5
The failure of labor law to protect the rights of American workers is
disturbing not only because "[flew human rights are more important than
the right of freedom of association," 6 but also because the exercise of that
right is essential to democracy. 7 The policies of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA or the Act)8 the heart of American labor law,
embody the fundamental democratic ideals of our society. As Professor
Ellen Dannin has written:
NLRA policies.., say that work and the way workers are treated
are central to the sort of country this is. The NLRA's values are
3 RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 89 (1999). Freeman and Rogers
further note that the workers who want, but do not have, a union receive lower wages, are
disproportionately black, and report particularly poor labor-management relations at their workplace;
they are, in other words, "just the sort of folks who could truly benefit from union representation." Id. A
more recent poll reveals that fifty percent of nonunion workers in America would vote for a union if
they had the opportunity. See CHARLES J. MORRIS, THE BLUE EAGLE AT WORK: RECLAIMING
DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 8 (2005). The author cites to a poll conducted in
2002 by Peter Hart Associates for the AFL-CIO.
4 FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 3, at 59.
5 LANCE COMPA, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: WORKERS' FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN THE UNITED
STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS 16 (2000).
6 JAMES A. GROSS, WORKERS' RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS I (James A. Gross ed., 2003).
7 See id. (observing that Senator Robert Wagner, the chief advocate of the National Labor
Relations Act, believed that independent labor unions and collective bargaining are essential to a
democratic form of government).
8 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006).
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emphatically pro-democracy. Its policies set out steps to give us
workplaces consistent with a democracy and to empower workers
by giving them the skills needed to be citizens of a democracy. 9
Consequently, as Professor Thomas Kohler has observed, "there is more
involved and more at stake in labor law reform than we may think."10
Kohler writes:
[A]nyone with serious concerns about the kind of people we are
making ourselves to be over the long run, and whether we can
sustain the sorts of habits necessary to the well-being of a
democracy, must pay close and critical attention to employment
and the way that relationship is ordered. Briefly stated, the
employment order involves far more than simply wage rates,
power relationships, productivity, quality, or workplace voice. It
quite literally involves the constitution of human beings. 1
Because of the fundamental importance of work to the development of
human personality and the goal of a just society, labor law is about much
more than economic efficiency or industrial peace: it is about human
dignity. The United States' Catholic Bishops observed in their pastoral
letter on the United States' economy,
[A]ll economic institutions must support the bonds of
community and solidarity that are essential to the dignity of
persons. Wherever our economic arrangements fail to conform
to the demands of human dignity lived in community, they
must be questioned and transformed.12
The economic and legal issues raised by labor law are also moral and
spiritual issues; labor unions are more than mere agents for their members.
They are "first of all instruments of solidarity and justice" whose mission is
to promote the common good:
Beyond their function of defending and vindicating, unions
have the duty of acting as representatives for "the proper
arrangement of economic life" and of educating the social
consciences of workers so that they will feel that they have an
9 ELLEN DANNIN, TAKING BACK THE WORKERS' LAW: HOW TO FIGHT THE ASSAULT ON LABOR
RIGHTS 41 (2006).
10 Thomas C. Kohler, The Overlooked Middle, in THE LEGAL FUTURE OF EMPLOYEE
REPRESENTATION 224, 226 (Matthew W. Finkin ed., 1994).
11 Id. at 228.
12 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, PASTORAL LETrER ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR
ALL: PASTORAL LETTER ON CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING AND THE U.S. ECONOMY1 28 (1986) [hereinafter
ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL].
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active role, according to their proper capacities and aptitudes,
in the whole task of economic and social development and in
the attainment of the universal common good.13
Because the ultimate ends of labor union activity are moral and spiritual,
the remaking of labor law in the twenty-first century must not ignore the
profound teachings of the Catholic Church on the meaning of work and the
dignity of workers. Although in a pluralistic society legislation must
ultimately be justified in terms of secular objectives, when the law deals
with fundamental questions of values, lawmakers can rely on religious
teachings to help them address these issues. 14 In this paper I will consider
one of the central tenets on Catholic Social Thought (hereinafter
abbreviated as CST) -the priority of labor over capital-and some
possible implications for the future of American labor law. Before doing
so, however, it is necessary to consider the reasons for the declining
influence of labor unions in the United States.
II. CAUSES OF UNION DECLINE IN THE UNITED STATES.
Scholars have identified numerous reasons for the precipitous drop in
union membership since its zenith in the 1950s.15 Technological changes
resulting in a sharp decline of blue-collar workers and the growth of white-
collar and service sector jobs eroded the traditional base of union support.16
The difficulty unions have faced in adjusting to the global economy and the
increased mobility of capital has contributed to the decline.17 Employer
opposition to concerted employee activity in general, and unions in
13 UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, Compendium of the Social Doctrine of
the Church 307 (2005) [hereinafter Social Doctrine].
14 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 12 (1988). Greenawalt
argues that when legislators address fundamental questions of values they may appropriately rely on
their religious convictions and on the convictions of their constituents. Id. Where labor law is
concerned, consideration of religious and moral beliefs is inescapable because "[t]he moral significance
of an employee's life on the job cannot be avoided, because it is primarily work that defines a man or a
woman." Theodore J. St. Antoine, Federal Regulation of the Workplace in the Next Half Century, 61
CHi.-KENT L. REv. 631, 646 (1985). Professor St. Antoine further observes that "[t]he goal of just,
sound labor law has to be the fullest feasible autonomy of the individual working person[, which is an]
unabashedly moral concept ... " Id.
15 Union density peaked in 1954, when union members constituted approximately thirty-five
percent of private sector, non-agricultural workers. See CHARLES B. CRAVER, CAN UNIONS SURVIVE?
THE REJUVENATION OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 34-35 (1993). Craver discusses the growth
of the labor movement after the enactment of the Wagner Act. Id.
16 Id. at 40-41 (discussing the effect of technological changes on the labor movement).
17 Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical Review and
Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REv. 351, 363-64 (2002) [hereinafter Labor and Employment Law]
(observing that "[a]dvances in technology and transportation have created a global economy" causing
unions to face intense employer resistance to unionization).
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particular, has always been intense in the United States and has resulted in
routine employer violations of the Wagner Act, chilling attempts at
employee organization.1 8 The growth of the contingent workforce of
independent contractors and temporary employees and the consequent
decline of long-term employment relationships have also contributed to
union decline.19 Deficiencies in the Act's regulatory structure are another
important cause of union decline.20 For example, the Act's reliance on
elections to determine union representation facilitates employer opposition.
Professor Befort explains:
Under the NLRA... an employer is not obliged to bargain
until after a union first establishes its majority status in a
representation election.... The NLRA permits an employer to
express its opposition to union representation so long as it does
not threaten reprisal for union support or promises benefits to
entice union opposition. Misstatements of fact and even
intentional lies are not forbidden. Many employers hire
professional consultants for the purpose of orchestrating
sophisticated anti-union campaigns that not infrequently
consist of unlawful as well as lawful conduct.21
During the election campaign, it is common for an employer to discharge
the leading employee organizers. While the tactic is illegal, the Act does
little to deter the unlawful discharge of employee organizers.22 When
unions do win representational status, attempts to bargain with the
18 See CRAVER, supra note 15, at 47-51 (discussing the history of virulent employer opposition to
unions in the United States and the willingness of many employers to violate the Wagner Act to stop
union organization); see also FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 3, at 86 (reporting that management
hostility to unions is the most important reason that employees are unwilling to vote for union
representation).
19 Labor and Employment Law, supra note 17, at 366-71 (noting that many contingent workers are
not protected by the Act and are difficult to organize even when they are covered by the Act because of
their weak affiliation with the enterprises where they are employed); see PETER CAPPELLI, THE NEW
DEAL AT WORK: MANAGING THE MARKET-DRIVEN WORKFORCE 110 (1999) (discussing the incentive
employers have to outsource jobs and to lease workers to avoid labor law obligations).
20 Labor and Employment Law, supra note 17, at 371-72 (observing that scholars often point to
the "weaknesses in the NLRA regulatory scheme, in that it treats many anti-union tactics as lawful and
fails adequately to deter others that are not").
21 Id. at 372. Professor Befort notes that in many industrialized countries "an employer
automatically must bargain with a union concerning the rights of its members. Under such a system,
employers play no overt role in an employee's decision to join a union, and any opposition to union
demands typically does not occur until the parties meet at the bargaining table." Id.
22 Id. at 373. Professor Befort explains that the usual remedy for the unlawful discharge of an
employee during a union organization drive is a cease and desist order coupled with reinstatement and
back pay. Id. Befort further notes that the Act "does not provide for fines, punitive damages, or any
other 'penalty,' and the discharged employee is subject to a duty to mitigate losses by finding
alternative work. This 'make whole' approach provides little deterrence against employers who realize
that they can chill union organization efforts by immediately firing the employee organizers." Id.
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employer are often futile because of the Act's weak remedial scheme,
which does little to punish an employer who refuses to bargain in good
faith.23 The NLRB lacks the power to impose substantive contract terms
when an employer fails to bargain in good faith, thereby allowing
employers to engage in "surface bargaining" with impunity.2 4 Furthermore,
when the bargaining process has been delayed by employer unfair labor
practices, such as the refusal to bargain in good faith, the NLRB has
"refused to fashion 'make whole' damage relief [a refusal] that deprives
workers of wages and benefits that would otherwise be negotiated in a
collective bargaining agreement." 25 Because the Act provides little
deterrence for bad-faith bargaining, "[a]pproximately one-third of all newly
certified union representatives fail to conclude a first contract," a failure
which often leads to the de-certification of the union.26 In addition to
facilitating employer opposition to unions during a representational
campaign and at the bargaining table, the Act also gives the employer a
powerful weapon to use in the event of a strike: the permanent replacement
of economic strikers.27 Shortly after the passage of the Wagner Act, the
Supreme Court held that employers have the right to permanently replace
economic strikers.2 8 The prospect of permanent replacement means that
"resort to the statutory 'right' to strike would be, for many employees, an
exercise in permanent job loss, and, for the union, an act of potential self-
immolation." 29 Indeed, the employer's right to permanently replace strikers
23 Id. (explaining that the only remedy available under the NLRA for a party who refuses to
engage in good faith bargaining is an order that requires the party to return to the bargaining table).
24 Id. at 373-74 (citing H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 102 (1970) (holding that a bad-
faith failure to bargain by an employer may not be remedied by the imposition of a substantive clause in
the collective bargaining agreement)).
25 WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM: THE FUTURE OF THE EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONSHIPS AND THE LAW 221 (1993) (discussing Ex-Cell-o Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107 (1970),
enforced, 449 F.2d 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1971), in which the Board determined that imposing a make whole
remedy for a failure to bargain in good faith "would indirectly necessitate the same kind of contract
imposition that the Court had found to be inconsistent with the statutory policy in H.K. Porter").
26 Labor and Employment Law, supra note 17, at 374.
27 Id. Professor Befort notes further that these permanent replacements also have the right to vote
in representational elections, allowing "an employer to rid itself of a union by pushing the employees
into a strike and then hiring permanent replacements who vote to decertify the union in an election held
a little more than twelve months after being hired." Id. at 374-75. See George Schatzki, Some
Observations and Suggestions Concerning a Misnomer-'Protected' Concerted Activities, 47 TEX. L.
REv. 378, 383 (1969). Professor George Schatzki has written that the employer's right to permanently
replace strikers is "an invitation" to the employer "to rid himself of union adherents and the union." Id.
28 NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938) (holding that "an employer,
guilty of no act denounced by the statute, has ... the right to protect and continue his business" by
hiring permanent replacements for striking employees).
29 Matthew W. Finkin, Labor Policy and the Enervation of the Economic Strike, 1990 U. ILL. L.
REv. 547, 567 (1990) (describing the serious risks facing employees who attempt to exercise their right
to strike).
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means that the difference between protected and unprotected concerted
activity by workers is largely a matter of semantics. 30 To make matters
worse, workers face a formidable array of other possible penalties if they
strike:
At the moment, the right to strike is so constrained by legal
and practical barriers that strikes are rarely used and even more
rarely used effectively. Strikers and unions employing the
strike face panoply of official sanctions that, taken together,
make the right to strike a costly and risky endeavor. In
addition to their legal right to hire permanent replacements,
employers can often bring lawsuits against unions that, one
way or another, run afoul of the many legal proscriptions on
the strike.... Major strikes have been responded to by martial
law, criminal indictments, fines, and military action.... Union
leaders have been arrested, jailed, and convicted of crimes for
encouraging violence, sometimes with very little evidence of
personal misconduct. The combination of RICO, a newly
expanded view of the Hobbs Act, and a greater willingness to
find that union officials encouraged or participated in violence,
all combine to increase the vulnerability of unions and union
leaders ... [for] strike misconduct. Without an effective right
to strike, collective bargaining becomes ineffectual, and the
desire of employees to join unions is inevitably reduced. 31
III. WORKERS' RIGHTS As HUMAN RIGHTS
All of the reasons discussed above for the decline of the American labor
movement are familiar to scholars and practitioners of labor law and have
been much discussed. In recent years, however, scholars have focused
their attention on a less obvious weakness of American labor law: the Act's
failure to recognize the right to organize and to collective bargaining as
basic human rights.32
30 See JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 28 (1983)
(observing that Mackay "shows that the functional difference between 'protected' and 'unprotected'
conduct is the difference between permanent replacement, on the one hand, and discharge prior to
replacement on the other" (emphasis omitted)).
31 Julius Getman, The National Labor Relations Act: What Went Wrong; Can We Fix It?, 45 B.C.
L. REV. 125, 135-36 (2003).
32 See GROSS, supra note 6, at 2; see also Jim Pope, Next Wave Organizing and the Shift to a New
Paradigm of Labor Law, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 515, 558 (2005-2006) [hereinafter Next Wave]. Pope
argues that "[n]ot until labor rights are recognized as fundamental freedoms, and not as mere means to
the end of facilitating commerce, can they command the respect necessary to hold their own against
corporate property rights." Pope, supra, at 558. In addition, increased interest in workers' rights as
human rights can be found in many scholarly works. Janice R. Bellace argues that "there are
fundamental human rights that must be permitted to exist at the workplace or else our [America's]
2009]
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Professor James Pope has noted that from the Wagner Act's inception,
courts have interpreted the Act in a way that gives much more weight to
employers' property rights than to workers' statutory rights.33 As Professor
Pope observes, one reason for the subordination of workers' rights is a
crucial flaw in the Act itself. When Senator Wagner was drafting the Act,
labor leaders urged him to ground the Act on Congress' power to protect
fundamental human rights. Instead, Senator Wagner chose to ground the
Act on Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce. 34 Professor Pope
writes that Senator Wagner chose to base his Act on the commerce clause
apparently because he believed that doing so would make the Act more
acceptable to the judiciary. 35 Hence, during the early, formative years of
NLRA jurisprudence, "each exercise of the NLRB's authority had to be
justified not in terms of labor freedom, but as an effort to prevent
disruptions to commerce." 36 Interpreted in this manner, the Act "reduced
the workers' rights to the status of mere means to the end of preventing
disruptions to commerce." 37 Professor Pope argues that casting workers'
rights as mere means to the end of industrial peace rather than fundamental
human rights had devastating results, including workers' loss of the right of
self-defense against employers that commit unfair labor practices,
employers' right to permanently replace economic strikers, employers'
right to exclude union organizers from their property, and employers' right
to close operations out of spite against workers who choose to organize. 38
Professor Pope has argued in favor of a constitutional right to strike
claim of freedom and democracy rings hollow." Janice R. Bellace, The Future of Employee
Representation in America: Enabling Freedom of Association in the Workplace in Changing Times
Through Statutory Reform, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 28 (2002). Larry W. Hunter posits that "there
is at present a reasonably clear consensus that freedom of association in the workplace, and the rights of
workers to organize and bargain collectively, should be regarded as fundamental human rights." Larry
W. Hunter, Considering What Workers Want, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 421, 421 (2001). Similarly,
James Gray Pope, notes the increased interest in establishing the right to organize as a meaningful civil
right. James Gray Pope, The First Amendment, the Thirteenth Amendment, and the Right to Organize in
the Twenty-First Century, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 941, 941 (1999) [hereinafter The First Amendment].
Further, it has been asserted that "[t]he right to form ... a union is a fundamental human and civil
right." KATE BRONFENBRENNER ET AL., ORGANIZING To WIN: NEW RESEARCH ON UNION STRATEGIES
5 (Kate Bronfenbrenner et al. eds., 1998).
33 James Gray Pope, How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, and Other Tales, 103 MICH.
L. REv. 518, 521-22 (2004) [hereinafter How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike] (arguing that
the Supreme Court has used the Constitution to elevate employers' property rights far above workers'
statutory rights).
34 Id. at 524.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 518-19 (stating that although the United States Constitution can trump federal statutes,
these statements "elevate[] the state common-law rights of employers over the federal statutory rights of
workers").
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grounded on the First and Thirteenth Amendments.39 The growing
consensus among labor law scholars that workers' rights are fundamental
human rights suggests that labor law in the twenty-first century will
envision workers' rights not as means to the end of eliminating obstacles to
interstate commerce, but as ends in themselves. The labor law that might,
and should, emerge in this century is one that will be based on the inherent
dignity of work and the transcendent importance of every human being
who contributes through work to the common good. Such a labor law will
inescapably be based on moral, not just economic, principles. This new
labor law will draw on many sources for its basic principles, and one of
these sources should be the profound teachings of CST on the dignity of
work.
Professor David Gregory is a pioneer in the application of CST to
American labor law.40 Professor Gregory has observed that the Catholic
Church has long regarded the right to unionize as a basic human right.41
Professor Gregory has observed that most labor lawyers in the United
States are unfamiliar with the profound insights of CST and are largely
unaware of the Church's "strong theoretical support of the rights of
workers" which has "been most unequivocally set forth in two major labor
encyclicals in 1891 and in 1981."42 Furthermore, the spirit of CST
"permeated the policy provisions of the NLRA in 1935."43 As Professor
Gregory has noted, CST stresses that workers' rights are never to be
considered as mere means to an end; rather it is capital which "remains
only a means subordinated to the service of people. Capital can never be
the end."44 CST offers a powerful critique of American labor law, which,
as Professor Pope observed, treats workers' rights as little more than means
to the end of facilitating interstate commerce. CST holds that such a view
"has exactly reversed the means and the ends, improperly reifying people
39 The First Amendment, supra note 32, at 943 (noting the possibility of forging a constitutional
right to organize out of the First and Thirteenth Amendments).
40 For an extended discussion of Professor Gregory's views on the Church's teachings about work
and the rights of workers, see David L. Gregory, Catholic Labor Theory and the Transformation of
Work, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 119 (1988).
41 David L. Gregory, The Right to Unionize as a Fundamental Human and Civil Right, 9 MISS. C.
L. REv. 135, 152-53 (1988) (acknowledging that Catholic social teaching "is a remarkable and
outstanding theoretical resource for supporting and revitalizing the fundamental human and civil right
of workers to unionize").
42 Id. at 151 (discussing LEO XIII, ENCYCLICAL LETTER RERUMNOVARUM(1891) and JOHN PAUL
II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER LABOREM EXCERCENS (1981) [hereinafter LABOREMEXCERCENS]).
43 Id. (noting that in 1891, Pope Leo XIII declared that "[1]abor and ownership need one another to
achieve and to maintain respect, harmony, and peace" in society).
44 Id. at 152 (stating that "Pope John Paul II has repeatedly reiterated unequivocal support of the
rights of workers").
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as expendable objects in the false pursuit of materialism." 45 Grounded in a
correct understanding of the relationship of capital to labor, the teachings
of the Catholic Church "can revitalize labor theory and, if their messages
are heeded, can further assist in the practical protection and enhancement
of the fundamental human and civil right of all workers to unionize." 46
In the following chapters, I will focus on one of CST's fundamental
principles that have important implications for labor law: the principle of
the priority of labor over capital.4 7 I will argue that the principle of the
priority of labor can and should be one of the bases for the new labor law
which will emerge in our century: a labor law that recognizes the moral and
spiritual importance of human labor.
IV. THE PRINCIPLE OF THE PRIORITY OF LABOR
A. The Principle.
The Church's teachings emphasize the dignity and profound meaning of
work. Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace has written:
Work is a fundamental right and a good for mankind, a useful
good, worthy of man because it is an appropriate way for him
to give expression to and enhance his human dignity. The
Church teaches the value of work not only because it is always
something that belongs to the person but also because of its
nature as something necessary. Work is needed to form and
maintain a family, to have a right to property, to contribute to
the common good of the human family.48
The relationship between work and the very purpose of existence is deep
and powerful. The Church teaches:
Human work proceeds directly from persons created in the
image of God and called to prolong the work of creation by
45 Id. (citing the teachings of Pope John Paul II in LABOREMEXERCENS).
46 Id. at 154.
47 In the following discussion, I do not maintain that my interpretation of the Church's teachings is
in any way the correct interpretation or that the practical implications I find in the Church's teachings
are the only implications one can find or the most important implications one can find. While the
Church's broad social principles have been clearly stated, the application of these principles to specific
situations is a difficult undertaking which requires a humble acknowledgment that many other valid
interpretations are possible. However, as the US Catholic Bishops have stated, it is important that the
Church's social teachings are not "left at the level of appealing generalities." ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR
ALL, supra note 12, T 20. It is important that Christians can take CST and use it "[to] undertake
concrete analysis and make specific judgments on economic issues." Id.
48 Social Doctrine, supra note 13, at 287.
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subduing the earth, both with and for one another.... Work
honors the Creator's gifts and the talents received from him. It
can also be redemptive. By enduring the hardship of work in
union with Jesus, the carpenter of Nazareth and the one
crucified on Calvary, man collaborates in a certain fashion
with the Son of God in his redemptive work. He shows
himself to be a disciple of Christ by carrying the cross, daily,
in the work he is called to accomplish. Work can be a means
of sanctification and a way of animating earthly realities with
the Sprit of Christ. 49
Given the profound importance of work, it is clear that each working
person is of transcendent importance. No one has written more powerfully
about the dignity of the working person than Pope John Paul II. In
Laborem Excercens John Paul II observed that
[T]here is no doubt that human work has an ethical value of its
own, which clearly and directly remain linked to the fact that
the one who carries it out is a person, a conscious and free
subject, that is to say a subject who decides about himself.50
Hence, according to John Paul II, "the primary basis of the value of work is
man himself, who is its subject." 51 Hence, while it is true "that man is
destined for work and called to it... work is 'for man' and not man 'for
work.' 5 2 Therefore,
[I]n the final analysis it is always man who is the purpose of
work, whatever work it is that is done by man-even if the
common scale of values rates it as the merest "service", as the
most monotonous even the most alienating work. 53
Unfortunately, modem economic systems are based on materialistic
principles which tend to treat work "as a special kind of 'merchandise', or
49 POPE JOHN PAUL II, APOSTOLIC CONSTITUTION CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 2427
(1994).
50 LABOREM EXERCENS, supra note 42, 6 (1981). John Paul Il's profound appreciation for the
meaning of work was rooted in his youthful experience performing physical labor in a stone quarry and
a water purification plant. See POPE JOHN PAUL 11, GIFT AND MYSTERY: ON THE FIFTIETH
ANNIVERSARY OF MY PRIESTLY ORDINATION 20-22 (1999). Of this experience, John Paul II wrote,
"[T]he stone quarry and water purification... plant at Borek Falecki became my seminary .... Having
worked with my hands, I knew quite well the meaning of physical labor. Every day I had been with
people who did heavy work. I came to know their living situations, their families, their interests, their
human worth, and their dignity." Id.
51 LABOREMEXERCENS, supra note 42,16 (emphasis omitted).
52 Id.
53 Id. (emphasis omitted).
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as an impersonal 'force' needed for production."54 Consequently, our
economic systems are plagued by
[A] confusion or even a reversal of the order laid down from
the beginning by the words of the Book of Genesis: man is
treated as an instrument of production, whereas he-he alone,
independently of the work he does-ought to be treated as the
effective subject of work and its true maker and creator. 55
It is this reversal of order, the confusion of ends and means that plagues
capitalism and that is present whenever man is not treated as the subject
and purpose of work. Consequently, "the analysis of human work ... goes
to the very heart of the ethical and social question." 56 When work is
correctly understood, one perceives that labor is prior to and superior to
capital. Pope John Paul II writes that to understand the true meaning of
work:
[W]e must first of all recall a principle that has always been
taught by the Church: the principle ot [sic] the priority of
labour over capital. The principle directly concerns the
process of production: in this process labour is always a
primary efficient cause, while capital, the whole collection of
means of production, remains a mere instrument or
instrumental cause. This principle is an evident truth that
emerges from the whole of man's historical experience. 57
The principle of the priority of labor over capital is crucial not only to a
proper understanding of work but also to the creation of a just society. As
Pope John Paul II observed, the principle of the priority of labor requires us
to:
[E]mphasize and give prominence to the primacy of man in the
production process, the primacy of man over things.
Everything contained in the concept of capital in the strict
sense is only a collection of things. Man, as the subject of
work and independently of the work that he does-man alone
is a person. This truth has important and decisive
consequences.58
One of the decisive consequences of the principle of the priority of labor is
54 Id. J7.
55 Id. (emphasis omitted).
56 Id.
57 Id. f 12 (emphasis omitted).
58 Id. (emphasis omitted).
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that economic issues are fundamentally moral issues. This truth lies at the
heart of the American Catholic Bishops' landmark pastoral letter on the
American economy:
Every economic decision and institution must be judged in
light of whether it protects or undermines the dignity of the
human person.... We believe the person is sacred-the
clearest reflection of God among us. Human dignity comes
from God, not from nationality, race, sex, economic status, or
any human accomplishment. We judge any economic system
by what it does for and to people and by how it permits all to
participate in it. The economy should serve the people, not the
other way around. 59
B. Implications for Labor Law.
1. Participation.
In his commentary on Laborem Exercens, Gregory Baum observed that
because capital is meant to serve labor, and not the other way around,
justice must include "the right of the people who do the work to participate
in the decisions regarding production, distribution and the use of capital." 60
Pope John Paul II stressed that worker participation is vital to a just society:
The technological workbench at which [workers] labor must in
some sense be their own. They must be responsible for it.
Whether industries are owned by private companies or by the
government, what is necessary is that workers become in some
sense co-owners, achieve co-responsibility for production and
the use of capital, and co-determine the policy of the
industry. 61
Pope John Paul II stressed that CST:
[R]ecognizes the legitimacy of workers' efforts to obtain full
respect for their dignity and to gain broader areas of
participation in the life of industrial enterprises so that, while
cooperating with others and under the direction of others, they
can in a certain sense "work for themselves"--through the
59 ECONOMJCJUSTICEFORALL, supra note 12, 13.
60 GREGORY BAUM, THE PRIORITY OF LABOR: A COMMENTARY ON LABOREM EXERCENS
ENCYCLICAL LETTER OF POPE JOHN PAUL II 30(1982).
61 Id. at 42.
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exercise of their intelligence and freedom.62
Although Pope John Paul II's words do not necessarily endorse a
European-style co-determination of enterprises, they certainly imply a
much wider scope of employee participation in the control of the workplace
than is permitted under American labor law. As interpreted by the
Supreme Court, the NLRA strictly limits the topics about which
management must bargain with labor. The Court has held that employers
have an obligation to bargain in good faith with respect to "wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment," but has no duty to bargain
over other matters. 63 The court interpreted the Act's duty to bargain in
good faith as creating a dichotomy of mandatory subjects of bargaining and
permissive subjects of bargaining. The mandatory/permissive distinction is
very important because a party may insist that the other party bargain in
good faith only over a mandatory subject, and it is an unfair labor practice
not to do so. 64
While the union prevailed in the first Supreme Court case to address
which topics are mandatory subjects of bargaining,65  the
mandatory/permissive dichotomy has become an impediment to effective
employee participation in the workplace. 66 The problems that would result
from the Court's willingness to decide the subjects of mandatory
bargaining, rather than allowing the parties themselves to decide, were
foreshadowed in a concurring opinion by Justice Stewart in Fibreboard
Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB.67 Fibreboard involved a decision by the
employer to contract out maintenance work that had formerly been done by
bargaining unit employees. The Court held that contracting out work
previously performed by an existing bargaining unit is a mandatory subject
62 JOHN PAUL I!, ENCYCLICAL LETrER CENTESIMUS ANNUS 43 (1991) [hereinafter CENTESIMUS
ANNUS].
63 NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958) (holding that an
employer's insistence that a collective bargaining agreement contain a clause requiring a vote by
employees on the employer's last offer and a clause which would exclude the workers' chosen union as
a party to the collective bargaining agreement are not mandatory subjects of bargaining).
64 See, e.g., Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 209-10 (1964) (holding that an
employer's refusal to bargain over the mandatory subject of contracting out work previously performed
by bargaining unit members violated § 8(a)(5) of the Act).
65 See Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. at 343-44 (enforcing NLRB's order directing the employer to cease
insisting on the inclusion of non-mandatory subjects in the collective bargaining agreement).
66 See GOULD, supra note 25, at 170-73 (discussing how the mandatory/permissive dichotomy has
allowed the NLRB and the courts to indirectly control the substance of bargaining and arguing that it
would be better to require bargaining on all subjects of importance to the parties); see also ATLESON,
supra note 30, at 124 (stating how the mandatory/permissive dichotomy has limited unions' ability to
bargain on matters of vital importance to their members).
67 379 U.S. at 221-26 (Stewart, J., concurring) (Justice Stewart agreed with the Court's decision
"[w]ithin the narrow limitations implicit in the specific facts of this case").
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of bargaining.68 However, in what would become an influential concurring
opinion, Justice Stewart emphasized that the holding in Fibreboard was
limited to the facts of the case:
The question posed [in Fibreboard] is whether the particular
decision sought to be made unilaterally by the employer in this
case is a subject of mandatory collective bargaining within the
statutory phrase "terms and conditions of employment." That
is all the Court decides. The Court most assuredly does not
decide that every managerial decision which necessarily
terminates an individual's employment is subject to the duty to
bargain. Nor does the Court decide that subcontracting
decisions are as a general matter subject to that duty....
Within the narrow limitations implicit in the specific facts of
this case, I agree with the Court's decision. 69
Justice Stewart goes on to emphasize that the Act "defines a limited
category of issues subject to compulsory bargaining." 70 Justice Stewart
acknowledges that many decisions which affect employment security are
rightly considered mandatory subjects of bargaining, but hastens to add that
"it surely does not follow that every decision which may affect job security
is a subject of compulsory collective bargaining."7' He explains:
Many decisions made by management affect the job security of
employees. Decisions concerning the volume and kind of
advertising expenditures, product design, the manner of
financing, and sales, all may bear upon the security of the
workers' jobs. Yet it is hardly conceivable that such decisions
so involve "conditions of employment" that they must be
negotiated with the employees' bargaining representative. 72
Justice Stewart further emphasized that there are decisions that "may quite
clearly imperil job security, or indeed terminate employment entirely"
which are not mandatory subjects of bargaining.73 For example,
An enterprise may decide to invest in labor-saving machinery.
Another may resolve to liquidate its assets and go out of
business. Nothing the Court holds today should be understood
as imposing a duty to bargain collectively regarding such
68 Id. at 209.
69 Id. at 218 (Stewart, J., concurring).
70 Id. at 220.
71 Id. at 223.
72 Id.
73 Id.
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managerial decisions, which lie at the core of entrepreneurial
control. Decisions concerning the commitment of investment
capital and the basic scope of the enterprise are not in
themselves primarily about conditions of employment, though
the effect of the decision may be necessarily to terminate
employment.... [M]anagement decisions which are
fundamental to the basic direction of a corporate enterprise or
which impinge only indirectly upon employment security
should be excluded [from the duty to bargain collectively]. 74
Justice Stewart's opinion has been justly criticized as imposing an
unwarranted limitation on the scope of collective bargaining. Professor
Atleson, for example, writes:
[A]lthough his attempt is unique, Stewart fails to explain other
than in ipse dixit fashion why capital or "direction" decisions
are not within the scope of bargaining.... Indeed, a review of
the legislative history of the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act supports a
broad reading of the scope of bargaining. The House bill had
attempted to limit mandatory terms to specified items relating
very closely to wages and benefits, thus implicitly excluding
other matters. This attempt to specify the scope of bargaining
was rejected in favor of the broader language now found in the
Act.75
Furthermore, as Professor Atleson has noted, "[b]argaining over important
decisions hardly means management is barred from acting.... Rather it is
textbook law that management can act after bargaining, usually after an
impasse has been reached." 76 Moreover, as Professor Atleson observed, the
vagueness of the concept of the "core of entrepreneurial control"
undermines the Act's goal of encouraging collective bargaining:
The practical effect of vague rules or even case-by-case
adjudication in this area lies in the area of remedies. If
employers are motivated to act and not bargain, little can be
done when a year or two later the employer has been found
remiss in failing to bargain. Equipment may have been sold or
moved, and the enterprise, or a part of it, may have been
closed. The result is a lack of effective remedies which, given
74 Id.
75 ATLESON, supra note 30, at 127 (observing that Congress concluded that the scope of
bargaining depends initially upon the power of the parties and, more broadly, upon "social and
political" factors).
76 Id. at 129 (noting that truly necessary exceptions to bargaining could be made if management
must act with "unusual dispatch").
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the vagueness of the "core" concept, does not encourage
respect for the law or aid in prediction. 77
The dangers of collective bargaining inherent in Justice Stewart's concept
of entrepreneurial control became unmistakably clear in 1981 when the
Supreme Court essentially adopted Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in
First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB.78 The question presented in
First National Maintenance was succinctly stated by Justice Blackmun:
Must an employer, under its duty to bargain in good faith
"with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment," §§ 8(d) and 8(a)(5) of the National Labor
Relations Act ... negotiate with the certified representative of
its employees over its decision to close part of a business? 79
This case involved an employer, First National Maintenance (FNM), which
provided housekeeping, cleaning, maintenance, and related services for its
customers in New York City.80 One of FNM's customers was "Greenpark
Care Center, a nursing home in Brooklyn." 81 Approximately thirty-five of
FNM's employees were employed at the nursing home. 82 FNM's
relationship with the nursing home was neither smooth nor profitable, and
eventually FNM terminated its contract with Greenpark. 83 FNM's
employees were represented by the National Union of Hospital and Health
Care Employees. When FNM notified the employees who worked at the
nursing home that they were going to be discharged, the union asked FNM
to delay its decision for the purpose of bargaining.84 FNM refused,
informing the union that its decision to discharge the employees was purely
economic and final. 85
The union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB, which
found in favor of the union and ordered FNM to bargain over the decision
77 Id. at 132.
78 Compare First Nat'l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 686 (1981) (concluding that the
necessity of an employer's ability to operate freely in determining whether to close down part of its
enterprise for purely economic reasons prevails over any benefit a union would derive from being a part
of that decision, and that the decision itself is not one of the statutory "terms and conditions" subject to
bargaining), with Fibreboard, 379 U.S. at 223 (Stewart, J., concurring) (asserting that "[nothing the
Court holds today should be understood as imposing a duty to bargain collectively regarding such
managerial decisions, which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control").
79 First Nat'l, 452 U.S. at 667.
80 Id. at 668.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 668-69.
84 Id. at 669.
85 Id. at 669-70.
2009]
ST JOIN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
to discharge the employees.86 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit enforced the NLRB order, holding that section 8(d) of the
Act creates a presumption in favor of mandatory bargaining over an
employer's decision to close part of its business. 87 Because the court of
appeals' decision was at odds with the decisions of other courts of appeal,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 88
Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun observed that "in establishing
what issues must be submitted to the process of bargaining, Congress had
no expectation that the elected union representative would become an equal
partner in the running of the business enterprise in which the union's
members are employed." 89 Justice Blackmun wrote that there are three
types of management decisions. There are decisions "such as [the] choice
of advertising and promotion, product type and design, and financing
arrangements, [which] have only an indirect ... impact on the employment
relationship" and are not mandatory subjects of bargaining. 90 A second
type of management decision involves matters "such as the order of
succession of layoffs and recalls, production quotas, and work rules,
[which] are almost" always mandatory subjects of bargaining. 91 Justice
Blackmun observed that the type of decision at issue in First National
Maintenance
[C]oncerns a third type of management decision, one that had a
direct impact on employment, since jobs were inexorably
eliminated by the termination, but had as its focus only the
economic profitability of the contract with Greenpark, a
concern under these facts wholly apart from the employment
relationship. This decision, involving a change in the scope
and direction of the enterprise, is akin to the decision whether
to be in business at all, "not in [itself] primarily about
conditions of employment, though the effect of the decision
86 See id. at 670-72 (stating the NLRB also ordered FNM to pay back-pay to the employees and
either to reinstate them or to offer them equivalent positions at FNM's other operations).
87 Id. at 672.
88 Id. at 674.
89 Id. at 676. See ALAN HYDE, The Story of First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB:
Eliminating Bargaining For Low-Wage Service Workers, in LABOR LAW STORIES 281, 302 (Laura J.
Cooper & Catherine L. Fisk eds., 2005). The article notes that while it is certainly true that Congress
did not intend to make unions equal partners with management in the operation of businesses, this fact
does not require one to conclude that Congress intended to preclude collective bargaining over any
issue of importance to workers. Id. As Professor Alan Hyde observed in his incisive critique of First
National Maintenance, "Congress in fact did not explicitly state that it intended to exclude any subjects
from bargaining, and in fact rejected proposals to do just that." Id.
90 First Nat l, 452 U.S. at 676-77.
91 Id. at677.
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may be necessarily to terminate employment." 92
Observing that an employer "must be free from the constraints of the
bargaining process to the extent essential for the running of a profitable
business," the Court held that bargaining over this third type of
management decisions, which "have a substantial impact on the continued
availability of employment should be required only if the benefit, for labor-
management relations and the collective bargaining process outweighs the
burden placed on the conduct of the business." 93 Turning to the issue
before it-an economically motivated decision to shut down part of a
business-the Court maintained that the Act is not intended to serve the
individual interests of either management of labor "but to foster in a neutral
manner a system in which the conflict between these interests may be
resolved." 94 The Court stated that, therefore, it must "consider whether
requiring bargaining over this sort of decision will advance the neutral
purposes of the Act." 9 5 The Court held that requiring bargaining would not
advance the purposes of the Act:
We conclude that the harm likely to be done to an employer's
need to operate freely in deciding whether to shut down part of
its business purely for economic reasons outweighs the
incremental benefit that might be gained through the union's
participation in making the decision, and we hold that the
decision itself is not part of § 8(d)'s "terms and conditions"
over which Congress has mandated bargaining.96
Analyzing this decision in light of the doctrine of the priority of labor, I
believe that First National Maintenance is inconsistent with CST's
teaching that workers have a right to participate in decisions that affect
their lives. Indeed American labor law's distinction between mandatory
92 Id. (citing Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring)).
93 Id. at 678-79.
94 Id. at 680-81. As Professor Atleson has written, while the Court stressed the neutrality of the
Act, the Court's balancing test to determine whether to require bargaining over the type of decision at
issue in First National Maintenance in effect considers only the interests of management. ATLESON,
supra note 30, at 134. Professor Atleson observes that the Court stressed management's "'need for
speed, flexibility, and secrecy,' the need for confidentiality, and the need to avoid 'futile' bargaining
because the union would otherwise have a weapon for delay that could 'thwart management's intentions
in a manner unrelated to any feasible solution the union might propose."' Id. (quoting First Nat '1, 452
U.S. at 683). Professor Atleson further observes, "[i]t is depressing to note that none of these interests
was implicated in this case .... If the result is based upon a balancing of interests, it is surely an odd
approach. Only one side of the balance is considered, and the managerial interests conceivably involved
do not even have to actually be present." Id.
95 First Nat'l, 452 U.S. at 681.
96 Id. at 686 (citation omitted).
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and permissive subjects of bargaining is itself inconsistent with CST. The
Church teaches that a business enterprise "must be a community of
solidarity." 97 Hence, as the American Catholic bishops observed:
When companies are considering plant closures or the
movement of capital, it is patently unjust to deny workers any
role in shaping the outcome of these difficult choices.... The
capital at the disposal of management is in part the product of
the labor of those who have toiled in the company over the
years, including currently employed workers. As a minimum,
workers have the right to be informed in advance when such
decisions are under consideration, a right to negotiate with
management about possible alternatives, and a right to fair
compensation and assistance with retraining and relocation
expenses should these be necessary. Since even these minimal
rights are jeopardized without collective negotiation, industrial
cooperation requires a strong role for unions in our changing
economy. 98
The Bishops' teaching finds support in secular labor law scholarship.
Former chairperson of the NLRB, William Gould IV, has argued that
decisions such as First National Maintenance have allowed the NLRB and
the Supreme Court "to indirectly control the substance of bargaining by
determining which issues are more directly important to conditions of
employment." 99 Gould argues that the problems with the Court's decision
in First National Maintenance are significant:
That decision declaims against the proposition that labor is to
be "an equal partner" with management in the United States,
setting federal labor policy at odds with the codetermination
philosophy that has taken root in northern Europe, particularly
Germany. Perhaps it is inappropriate to require an equal
partnership under a statute that promotes collective bargaining.
But surely the idea of a partnership, as a general proposition, is
consistent with attempts to promote cooperation, the policy
that should be promoted in the section 8(a)(2) cases ....
Equally troubling, in my view, is the Court's statement... that
such matters as advertising and product design are
peculiarly.., the province of management prerogatives and
97 Social Doctrine, supra note 13, at 340.
98 ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 12, 303.
99 GOULD, supra note 25, at 171.
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therefore always nonmandatory subjects of bargaining .... 100
Professor Gould points out that not only employees, but employers also,
can benefit from worker participation in making decisions on
"nonmandatory" subjects.101 Employers at times appear to realize the
importance of worker participation also, as illustrated by recent research
which indicates that a majority of managers agree that many workplace
problems could be solved more easily if employees had more of a
collective voice. 102 Professor Gould concludes that it would be better to
require management to bargain on all subjects of importance to workers. 103
Requiring bargaining on all subjects of importance to workers is consistent
with the Church's principle of the priority of labor and the consequent right
of workers to participate in the direction of their enterprises. 104
The Church's vision of an economic order in which workers are partners
in the management of enterprises is based on a deep appreciation of the
vital importance of work to each person:
When man works, using all the means of production, he also
wishes the fruit of this work to be used by himself and others,
and he wishes to be able to take part in the very work process
as a sharer in responsibility ... at the workbench to which he
applies himself.... [I]t must be emphasized in general terms
that the person who works desires not only due rumuneration
[sic] for his work; he also wishes that ... the production
process provision [is] made for him to be able to know that in
his work ... he is working "for himself."105
Hence, each person who works must never be reduced to "a mere
production instrument;" he must become "a true subject of work with an
100 Id. at 172-73.
101 Id. at 173. Professor Gould offers the automobile industry as one example of the harm that can
result by declaring certain decisions to be exclusively managerial. In the 1950s Walter Reuther,
president of the United Automobile Workers, criticized American automobile manufacturers' failure to
produce fuel-efficient cars because of the likelihood of future oil scarcity and "for the consequent need
for the consuming public to purchase something different from what the Big Three was providing." Id.
The automobile manufacturers ignored Reuther with the result of declining profits and loss of jobs. Id.
As Professor Gould observes, the automobile example shows that "decision making in the managerial
prerogative arena" can have devastating effects on workers. Id.
102 FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 3, at 42-43 (reporting that fifty-eight percent of managers
surveyed believed that it would be easier to resolve many workplace problems if workers had a
collective voice).
103 GOULD, supra note 25, at 172.
104 BAUM, supra note 60, at 42 (citing LABOREMEXERCENS, supra note 42, 14 where Pope John
Paul 1I envisions an economic system in which "on the basis of his work each person is fully entitled to
consider himself a part owner of the great workbench where he is working with everyone else").
105 LABOREMEXERCENS, supra note 42, 70-71.
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initiative of his own." 10 6 Accordingly, Pope John Paul II writes:
The Church's teaching has always expressed the strong and
deep conviction that man's work concerns not only the
economy but also, and especially, personal values. The
economic system itself and the production process benefit
precisely when these personal values are fully respected. 107
Hence, a just economic system must preserve the worker's awareness of
working for himself. If this teaching is ignored, "incalculable damage is
inevitably done throughout the economic process, not only economic
damage but first and foremost damage to man." 108
Thus, American labor law's denial of the right to participate in most
decisions that involve the direction of the enterprise, which is the
consequence of the Court's holding in First National Maintenance is
inconsistent with CST. CST not only envisions an economic order in
which workers are, in fact, "equal partner[s] in the running of the business
enterprise" at which they are employed,109 it goes beyond the limitations of
collective bargaining and envisions an economic system in which workers
have an equal voice in the decisions that affect their lives. One implication
of the Church's teaching regarding the priority of labor over capital is that
our economic system should provide an effective means for all workers,
whether unionized or not, to participate in the management of the
enterprise. Hence, the Church's teachings, while fully supporting the right
to unionize,11 0 go well beyond the limits of American labor law by
106 Id. 71.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 First Nat'l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 676 (1981).
110 The Church's unequivocal support for the right of workers to form unions is part of an
unbroken tradition from Pope Leo XIII to John Paul 11. See DONAL DORR, OPTION FOR THE POOR: A
HUNDRED YEARS OF VATICAN SOCIAL TEACHING 365 (rev. ed. 1992). Dorr identifies the source of the
Church's support for labor unions in the fundamental values that unify the Church's social teaching,
including the importance of human dignity, the value of the person as a worker, the right of everybody
to the conditions required to be free and responsible, and the importance of human community and
solidarity. Id. Unions "are promoters of the struggle for social justice, for the rights of workers in their
particular professions." Social Doctrine, supra note 13, at 306 (emphasis omitted); see CENTESIMUS
ANNUS, supra note 62, T 7. Leo XIII emphasized the natural right to form associations such as unions in
his 1891 encyclical. LEO XIII, ENCYCLICAL LETTER RERUMNOVARUM 51 (1891) [hereinafter RERUM
NOVARUM]. John XXIII affirms the natural right of workers to form associations. JOHN XXIII,
ENCYCLICAL LETTER MATER ETMAGISTRA 22 (1961) [hereinafter MATER ETMAGISTRA]. Pope Paul VI
discussed the important role of labor unions. PAUL VI, APOSTOLIC LETTER OCTOGESIMA ADVENIENS
14 (1971) [hereinafter OCTOGESIMA ADVENIENS]. He described the right to form unions as one of the
basic rights of the human person. PAUL VI, PASTORAL CONSTITUTION GAUDIUM ETSPES 68 (1965)
[hereinafter GAUDIUM ETSPES. Further, Pope Pius XI encouraged Christian workers to form unions in
his 1931 encyclical. PiUS XI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER QUADRAGESIMO ANNO 31 (1931) [hereinafter
QUADRA GESIMO ANNO].
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emphasizing the right of all workers to participate in the management of
the enterprise where they labor."'l One way to promote the right to
participate by all workers, whether unionized or not, is the establishment of
works councils. In Germany, for example, mandatory works councils have
for decades proven to be successful vehicles to give workers a voice in a
broad range of issues.]1 2 Professor Weiler and many other scholars113 have
imagined a system of mandated works councils in which employees would
deal with their employers on issues that involve not only traditional union
concerns such as wages, benefits, and layoffs, but also issues that lie at the
heart of entrepreneurial control, including "plant closings, relocations,
technological and organizational innovation, and other such changes in the
firm's economic environment."114 More recently, Professor Befort writes
that one of the functions of his proposed American Works Councils Act
would be to consult with employers on topics that go beyond mandatory
subjects of bargaining under the NLRA, including entrepreneurial decisions
that may impact the performance and organization of work."l 5 Under
Befort's proposal, employees would have the automatic right to call for the
creation of a works council in enterprises above a certain minimum size
and to receive information periodically on personnel policies, financial
conditions, and "plans for future undertakings that may impact the
performance and organization of work."1 16 Professor Befort's proposed
111 See MATER ETMAGISTRA, supra note 110, 91 (stating that "employees are justified in wishing
to participate in the activity of the industrial concern for which they work"); see also, GA UDIUM ET
SPES, supra note 110, 68 (finding that the active sharing of everyone in the running of the enterprise
should be promoted).
112 See PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW 284 (1990) (noting that works councils have proven to be quite successful vehicles
for employee participation).
113 See CRAVER, supra note 15, at 96-97 (finding a positive evaluation of German works
councils); see also Stephen F. Befort, A New Voice for the Workplace: A Proposal for an American
Works Councils Act, 69 MO. L. REV. 607, 641-42 (2004) [hereinafter A New Voice] (setting forth the
elements of a proposed American Works Councils Act); Bellace, supra note 32, at 23-25 (discussing
favorably the strengths of European works councils, including the non-adversarial model of labor
relations which appeals to service and knowledge based workers); Karl E. Klare, Workplace Democracy
& Market Reconstruction: An Agenda for Legal Reform, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 54-55 (1988) (arguing
for the right to participation in governing the firm, perhaps even mandating statutorily employee
representation on corporate models of directors); Clyde W. Summers, Employee Voice and Employer
Choice: A Structured Exception to Section 8(a)(2), 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 129, 131 (1993) (stating his
belief that works councils "modeled on the German system could be structurally superimposed on our
collective bargaining system. It could be done in a way which would provide a form of representation to
those not now represented by unions without ... weakening our present collective bargaining system,
and perhaps substantially strengthening it").
114 WEILER, supra note 112, at 285 (stating that the topics that would regularly be addressed
would be "broader than that which is now required by the NLRA for employers engaged in full-fledged
bargaining").
115 A New Voice, supra note 112, at 641-42.
116 Id.at642.
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American Works Councils Act is consistent with CST's emphasis on the
right of workers to participate in economic decision-making. Pope John
XXIII stressed the importance of worker participation in his encyclical
Mater et Magistra. Pope John XXIII observed that "employees are
justified in wishing to participate in the activity of the industrial concern
for which they work.""17 While it is not possible, the Pope stated, to
determine explicitly the degree of participation that is proper to each
individual enterprise, employees nonetheless should have an active part in
the enterprises where they work and that it is of utmost importance that
productive enterprises assume the character of a true human fellowship
whose spirit suffuses the dealings, activities, and standing of all its
members."i 8 The importance of participation was later affirmed by the
Second Vatican Council, which observed that "[i]n economic enterprises it
is persons who are joined together, that is, free and independent human
beings created [in] the image of God.""l 9 Consequently, the active
participation of everyone in the running of the enterprise should be
promoted. 120 In more recent years, John Paul II stressed that CST
[R]ecognizes the legitimacy of workers' efforts to obtain full
respect for their dignity and to gain broader areas of
participation in the life of the industrial enterprises so that,
while cooperating with others and under the direction of
others, they can in a certain sense "work for themselves"
through the exercise of their intelligence and freedom. 121
In the American context, the U.S. Bishops have written of the importance
of "contributive justice," which provides that all persons "have an
obligation to be active and productive participants in the life of the society
and that society has a duty to enable them to participate ... ."122 CST's
strong affirmation of the right and duty to participate in economic decision-
making supports calls for a greater partnership between capital and labor
such as legislation providing for works councils that enable workers to
participate in key entrepreneurial decisions.
117 MATERETMAGISTRA,supra note 110, 91.
118 Id.
119 GAUDIUMETSPES, supra note 110, 1 68.
120 Id. The Council noted that such participation should take into account each person's function in
the enterprise and should provide for the necessary unity of operations. Id.
121 CENTESIMUSANNUS, supra note 62, 43.
122 ECONOMICJUSTICEFOR ALL, supra note 12, T 71 (emphasis omitted).
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2. Property Rights and Union Organizing.
Under the Act, the primary means for establishing employee
representation is the representation election. Congress provided for the
representation election as a means of protecting employees' freedom to
choose.123 However, the union representation election is not at all
conducted on a level playing field. It often takes place in an atmosphere of
intimidation, which frustrates rather than promotes employees' freedom to
choose. As Professor James Pope has written:
To most Americans, the word "election" connotes a political
contest between two parties of equal legal status. The party
currently in office is prohibited from using the power of
government against the opposition party. But union
representation campaigns are conducted on turf controlled by
one of the competing parties, namely the employer. Current
law allows employers to use this control to gain advantages
unheard of in political elections. The employer may command
voters to attend anti-union rallies on pain of discharge. It may
require voters to meet one-on-one with their supervisors to
hear anti-union messages. And it may adopt and enforce a rule
prohibiting everyone but itself from campaigning during work
time. 124
In addition to these advantages, the employer also enjoys one other
advantage, which greatly limits employees' freedom to choose under the
Act: the employer has the right to exclude union organizers from its
property.125 The Supreme Court created this right for employers by its
decision in Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB.126 In this case, the petitioner Lechmere
owned a retail store in a shopping plaza. The United Food and Commercial
Workers Union attempted to organize Lechmere's employees, and as part
of its organization drive, the union entered Lechmere's parking lot and
began to place handbills on the windshields of cars, most of which
123 See WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, A PRIMER ON AMERICAN LABOR LAW 47 (4th ed. 2004)
(observing that the "central theme" of NLRA election procedures is "the employees' freedom of
choice").
124 How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, supra note 33, at 539-40 (discussing the
deficiencies of American labor law which undermine the Act's goal of promoting employee choice
through free elections).
125 Id. at 540. Professor Pope observes that the unfair advantages that employers have in
representation campaigns could "be at least partly offset if union organizers could enter the workplace
to respond. But except in exceedingly rare circumstances, employers also enjoy the right to exclude
organizers from their property." Id.
126 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
2009]
ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
belonged to Lechmere's employees. 127 Lechmere's manager confronted the
union organizers and ordered them to leave. They did so, while
Lechmere's personnel removed the handbills.
2 8
The organizers made several subsequent attempts to put handbills on
employee cars in Lechmere's parking lot, and each time were told to
leave. 129 Eventually, the union organizers abandoned the tactic of entering
Lechmere's parking lot to distribute handbills, and after trying other
organizing tactics with little success, filed an unfair labor practice charge
alleging that Lechmere violated the Act by barring the non-employee
organizers from its property.130 The NLRB ruled in favor of the union,
finding that Lechmere had violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act which
prohibits employers from interfering with employees' right under section 7
of the Act to engage in concerted activity for the purpose of collective
bargaining (or other mutual aid or protections). 131 The First Circuit Court
of Appeals denied Lechmere's petition for review and enforced the
NLRB's order.132 The Supreme Court reversed. The Court observed that
so long as non-employee organizers "have reasonable access to employees
outside an employers' property," an employer might bar non-employee
organizers from entering its property.133 The Court made it clear that the
exception allowing non-employee organizers to enter an employer's
property is a very narrow one, which will apply in only unusual
circumstances.1 34 The exception will arise only when "the location of a
plant and the living quarters of the employees place the employees beyond
the reach of reasonable union efforts to communicate with them."135 The
Court's opinion makes it clear that under its interpretation of the Act, a
union must meet an almost impossible burden to demonstrate the need to
enter an employer's property for the purpose of union organizing. The
Court stated that such access to employer property is protected by the Act
only when employees, by virtue of their employment, "are isolated from
the.., flow of information that characterizes our society."136 Turning to
the facts in Lechmere, the Court observed that because the employees did
127 Id. at 529.
128 Id. at 530.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 530-31.
131 Id. at 531-32 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1) (2000)).
132 Id. at 531.
133 Id. at 538.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 539 (citing NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956)) (emphasis
omitted).
136 Id. at 540.
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not reside on the employer's property, they were presumptively not beyond
the reach of the union's message. 137 The Court stated that the union could
have tried to organize the employees using phone calls, home visits, mass
mailings, advertisements in local papers, or displaying signs on the strip of
public land adjoining Lechmere's parking lot.138 Hence, "[b]ecause the
union.., failed to establish the existence of any 'unique obstacles' that
frustrated access to Lechmere's employees, the [NLRB] erred [by finding]
that Lechmere had committed an unfair labor practice . ."139
Many eminent labor law scholars have criticized the Lechmere decision.
Professor Pope, for example, observes that under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
NRDC, Inc.,140 the NLRB's interpretation of the Act's language was
entitled to broad deference unless the Court could find contrary "clear
meaning" in the statute. 141 Professor Pope observes that Justice Thomas,
the author of Lechmere, found it significant that the Act guarantees the
right of organization to employees, not to non-employees; therefore, Justice
Thomas concluded that the Act gives much stronger protection to the
organizing activities of employees than it gives to non-employees.142
However, Professor Pope notes that the Act includes as employees any
employee except those who are not employed by employers as defined by
the Act.143 As Professor Pope observes, union organizers are employees
protected by the Act because labor unions are not excluded from the Act's
definition of employer.144 Indeed the Act explicitly states that the term
"'employee' shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer.
S. ."145 Hence, under Chevron, the Court should have deferred to the
NLRB's interpretation of the Act which permitted union organizers to enter
137 Lechmere, Inc., v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 540 (1992).
138 Id. at 540 (illustrating possible alternatives).
139 Id. at 541 (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters,
436 U.S. 180, 205-06 n. 41 (1979)).
140 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
141 How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, supra note 33, at 541.
142 Id.
143 Id. Section 2(3) of the Act states that "[t]he term 'employee' ... shall not include any
individual employed.., by any other person who is not an employer as herein defined." 29 U.S.C. §
152(3) (2000).
144 How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, supra note 33, at 542. However, the National
Labor Relations Act § 152(2) excludes unions from the definition of employer except when they are
acting as an employer. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2000). Professor Pope explains that unions were partially
excluded from the definition of employer so that they could not be charged with an unfair labor practice
when they engaged in organizing activities. How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, supra note
33, at 542. If unions were not partially excluded from the Act's definition of employer, they could be
charged with violating section 8(a)(3) of the Act by participating in the organizational activities of
workers. Id.
145 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000).
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Lechmere's property.146 As Professor Pope has shown, not only is there no
contrary clear meaning in the Act to foreclose deference under Chevron,
the plain language of the Act is consistent with the NLRB's finding that the
Act protected the activities of union organizers in Lechmere. 147
Prominent labor law scholars have argued that Lechmere should be
overruled. Noting the crucial importance of union access to the electoral
model that Congress provided in the Act, Professor Samuel Estreicher
writes:
[W]e need to improve the access rights of unions in order to
ensure that the NLRB-supervised election truly provides an
accurate poll of employee wishes. That is, after all, the
rationale for preferring the electoral model over "automatic"
certification procedures. The Supreme Court's recent
Lechmere decision should be overruled; parking lots in
shopping malls are generally open to the public and should be
available to union organizers for nondisruptive informational
picketing and handbilling .... Also, since employers presently
have the right to hold "captive audience" addresses on their
property, unions should have the right to come on the premises
to address the workers at a scheduled time shortly before an
NLRB election.148
Professor Ellen Dannin has rightly criticized the Court's imprecision about
the rights at stake in Lechmere and suggested an alternative interpretation
of what was at stake:
Vagueness and failing to communicate which NLRA and
employer rights are relevant to a case only invite judges to
draw conclusions based on their preconception about rights.
Recall that in Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, the Court said that the
conflict was between the employer's right to control access to
its property and the employees' right to hear the union
organizers' message. Notice that this set up a situation in
which the employee right was far weaker than the employer's
right. Contrast this with a case in which the employee rights
were core NLRA rights of employees to make common cause
with one another to engage in mutual aid or protection, to
146 See How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, supra note 33, at 541 (stating that the
Court, under its holding in Chevron, should have deferred to the NLRB's interpretation of the Act
unless there was contrary "clear meaning" in the Act, which there was not).
147 Id.
148 Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World of Competitive Product Markets, in THE
LEGAL FuTuRE OF EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION, supra note 10, at 47.
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select representatives of their own choosing, to improve their
purchasing power, and to stabilize wages and working
conditions within and between industries. These are strong
rights.... It is fair to say that these were the rights involved in
Lechmere. 14 9
Former chairperson of the NLRB, William Gould, has argued that
Congress should reverse the Lechmere decision:
While it may be fair to assume that some kind of balance
between statutory rights and private property are presumed
under the Act, it seems reasonable that the balance ought to be
weighted on the side of the freedom of association rights
protected by the statute itself and not private property, because
of the statute's explicit protection of the former and not the
latter.... Lechmere is completely out of step.., and Congress
should reverse the decision as part of labor law reform-and
provide for periodic nonemployee union-organizer access to
company... property closed off to the public once a
representation petition has been filed.]5 0
The Church's teachings regarding the right to own property support the
position of those scholars who urge that Lechmere should be overruled.
CST, of course, has always strongly affirmed the right to private
property.151 However, the Church has also emphasized the fundamental
Christian principle that "the goods of this world are originally meant for
all." 52 As Pope John Paul II explained, private property "is under a 'social
mortgage,' which means that it has an intrinsically social function."153 In
powerful terms, John Paul set forth the importance of this social mortgage
for the relationship of capital and labor:
[I]n the Church's teaching, ownership has never been
understood in a way that could constitute grounds for social
conflict in labour.... [P]roperty is acquired first of all through
149 DANNIN, supra note 9, at 105-06.
150 GOULD, supra note 25, at 157-58.
151 See RERUM NOVARUM, supra note 110, T 7 (stating that the right to private property is in
accordance with natural law); see also JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LEITER SOLLICITUDO REISOCIALIS
42 (1987) (stating that the right to private property is valid and necessary).
152 SOLLICITUDO REI SOCIALIS, supra note 151, 42 (referring to the Church's doctrine of the
universal destination of goods, which holds that the goods of the earth are meant for everyone). Cf
Social Doctrine, supra note 13, at 177 (asserting that "[t]he principle of the universal destination of
goods is an affirmation both of God's full and perennial lordship over every reality and of the
requirement that the goods of creation remain ever destined to the development of the whole person and
all of humanity").
153 SOLLJCITUDO REI SOCIALS, supra note 152, 42.
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work in order that it may serve work. This concerns in a
special way ownership of the means of production. Isolating
these means as a separate property in order to set it up in the
form of "capital" in opposition to "labour"-and even to
practise the exploitation of labour-is contrary to the very
nature of these means and their possession.... [W]hether in
the form of private ownership or in the form of public or
collective ownership-[which] is that they should serve labor,
and thus, by serving labor, that they should make possible the
achievement of the first principle of this order, namely, the
universal destination of goods and the right to common use of
them. 154
Hence, the Church very clearly teaches that private property is not an end
in itself, but a means to an end-to enhance the dignity of work and the full
development of the worker as a child of God.155 Along with this profound
teaching on the purpose of private property and the economic order, the
Church offers an understanding of labor unions that stresses their ultimate
purpose, which is:
[N]ot simply to defend the existing wages and prerogatives of
the fraction of workers who belong to them, but also to enable
workers to make positive and creative contributions to the
firm, the community, and the larger society in an organized
and cooperative way.156
CST's understanding of labor unions as a means for workers to make
valuable contributions to the common good, rather than the impoverished
view of unions as merely another special interest group, argues for a labor
law that facilitates, rather than hinders, union organizing. From a CST
perspective, Lechmere is inconsistent with the Church's teachings on
unions and the purpose of private property and should be overturned.
154 LABOREMEXERCENS, supra note 50, 14.
155 See Mark A. Sargent, Competing Visions of the Corporation in Catholic Social Thought, I J.
CATH. Soc. THOUGHT 561, 565 (2004) (explaining that in CST, private property is not an end in itself
but a means to human flourishing); see also LABOREM EXERCENS, supra note 50, 14 (stating that the
Church's understanding of private property as a means to serve people results in a vision of the
corporation as an institution that "must produce not just wealth, but the conditions under which human
persons may flourish spiritually") (citing J. Michael Stebbins, Business, Faith, and the Common Good,
ST. JOHN'S U. REV. Bus., Fall 1997, at 5 (suggesting that the purpose of the economic order is to
facilitate the "pursuit of higher values, including the highest value of all, the ultimate goal of union with
God")).
156 ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 12, 304.
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3. Sit-Down Strikes and Workers' Right to Self-Defense.
CST unmistakably teaches that labor-management relations should be
cooperative and peaceful, not adversarial.1 57 However, the Church also
teaches that "[r]ecourse to a strike is morally legitimate when it cannot be
avoided, or at least when it is necessary to obtain a proportionate
benefit."158 While the Church's teachings on the moral legitimacy of the
strike weapon are somewhat vague, it is clear that the Church regards the
strike as "an extreme means," which "must not be abused."1 59 However, I
believe that the Church's teaching that the strike is morally legitimate when
unavoidable must be read in light of its teaching that ownership of the
means of production is legitimate only when such ownership serves labor
and promotes "the universal destination of goods and the right to common
use of them."160 American labor law is deeply inconsistent with these
teachings in that it embodies a strong preference for employers' property
rights at the expense of workers' rights.161 This privileging of employers'
property rights over employees' right to organize and engage in collective
bargaining is most evident in labor law's much-criticized doctrine of the
permanent replacement of strikers.162 Not only does labor law privilege
157 See RERUMNOVARUM, supra note 110, 19 (observing that capital and labor need each other
and that "[m]utual agreement results in the beauty of good order"); see also Mark Barenberg, The
Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 1381, 1427-28 (1993) (observing that Senator Robert Wagner, the architect of American labor
law, strongly preferred a cooperative model of labor relations and understood collective bargaining to
be "profoundly integrationist and cooperationist, not conflictual and adversarial, as is conventionally
supposed"); FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 3, at 141-42 (finding that the Church's emphasis on
cooperative labor relations is in accordance with the desire of a large majority of American workers);
Social Doctrine, supra note 13, at 306 (noting that "[t]he Church's social doctrine teaches that relations
within the world of work must be marked by cooperation"); GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra note 110, 68
(stating that when socioeconomic disputes occur, the parties must make efforts to arrive at a peaceful
settlement and that "[r]ecourse must always be had first to a sincere dialogue between the parties");
QUADRAGESIMO ANNO, supra note 110, 81 (proclaiming that it is the duty of the state and all good
citizens to get rid of class conflict and to promote harmony among the various groupings of society).
158 CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 49, 2435; see LABOREM EXERCENS,
supra note 50, 20 (explaining that CST regards the strike "as legitimate in the proper conditions and
within just limits").
159 LABOREM EXERCENS, supra note 50, 20 (emphasis omitted).
160 Id. 14; see Social Doctrine, supra note 13, at 177 (teaching that private property is "in its
essence only an instrument for respecting the principle of the universal destination of goods; in the final
analysis, therefore, it is not an end but a means").
161 See Bellace, supra note 32, at 11 (observing that the American judiciary presumes that
property rights prevail over employees' right to organize); see also Next Wave, supra note 33, at 519
(noting that American labor law elevates the property rights of employers over the statutory rights of
employees).
162 For a discussion of NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938) see supra notes
28-30. For excellent critiques of the Mackay Doctrine, see ATLESON, supra note 30, at 19-34, see
CRAVER, supra note 15, at 143-45, and see WEILER, supra note 112, at 264-69. For a discussion of
how the permanent replacement of strikers can damage entire communities, see BARRY BLUESTONE &
IRVING BLUESTONE, NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE: A LABOR PERSPECTIVE ON AMERICAN BUSINESS 259-
STJOJN'SJOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY
employers' property rights over employees' right to strike, it also privileges
property rights over employees' right to self-defense in the face of
egregious unfair labor practices. 163
Privileging of property rights over workers' rights is evident not only in
the Mackay decision but also in other decisions where the Court
subordinates workers' rights to employers' property rights. A striking
example of the Court's tendency to privilege property rights over workers'
rights is NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp.164 in which the Court held
that the sit-down strike is not protected by the Act, and then proceeded to
set aside the NLRB's order that the employer, which had committed
egregious unfair labor practices, should reinstate employees who had been
discharged for engaging in the sit-down strike. 165
In this case, members of the Steel Workers Organizing Committee
occupied two buildings at the Fansteel factory and commenced a sit-down
strike. Prior to the strike, Fansteel had committed a number of unfair labor
practices, including planting a spy in the local union, transferring the local
union's president to an isolated location, establishing a company union, and
announcing that it would never bargain with the union under any
circumstances. 166 As Professor James Pope relates, union members felt that
their leaders were not protecting workers' rights, and the membership was
demanding action. 167 At the same time, Fansteel's spy within the union was
urging the employees to go out on a traditional strike so Fansteel could
bring in replacement workers and break the union. 168 Hence, as Professor
60 (1992) which comments on the 1987-88 strike against International Paper in Jay, Maine, where
International Paper's decision to permanently replace the striking workers shredded the social fabric of
the community. Because the permanent replacement doctrine has been much discussed by so many able
scholars, and because I think there is little doubt that the permanent replacement doctrine conflicts with
CST, I will focus instead on the use of means other than the traditional strike to enforce workers' right
to self-defense and to engage in collective bargaining. I will consider collective action that probably is
not protected by the Act and which is, in effect, peaceful civil disobedience, and I will address the
difficult question of whether such tactics might, under certain circumstances, be in accordance with the
principles of CST. Although I will focus on one tactic-the sit-down strike-my purpose is not to argue
for or against the sit-down per se. My purpose is to consider the broader issue of civil disobedience and
labor organizing by focusing on the sit-down strike and to speculate on what CST can teach us
regarding labor organizers' using tactics that are not protected by the Act.
163 See How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, supra note 33, at 520-26 (discussing
NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939)).
164 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
165 Id. at 498-99 (holding that Fansteel "stood absolved by the conduct of those engaged in the
'sit-down' from any duty to reemploy them").
166 See id. at 251-52 (describing the unfair labor practices); see also In re Fansteel Metallurgical
Corp., 5 N.L.R.B. 930, 935 (1938) (announcing the "unqualified opposition to outside unions").
167 How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, supra note 33, at 520 (citing Henry M. Hart,
Jr. & Edward F. Prichard, Jr., The Fansteel Case: Employee Misconduct and the Remedial Powers of
the National Labor Relations Board, 52 HAR. L. REv. 1275, 1280-81 (1939)).
168 Id. (citing Fansteel, 5 N.L.R.B. at 939).
[Vol. 24:1
CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING
Pope observes, the union leadership was "[c]aught between the necessity
for action and the perils of a traditional strike" and chose to defend
themselves from the employer's clear violations of the Wagner Act by
resorting to a sit-down strike.169
Professor Atleson points out that after Congress passed the Wagner Act
in 1935, vigorous attacks on the Act's constitutionality hampered the
NLRB's power to enforce the Act and resulted in the need for concerted
action by workers to force employers to recognize and bargain with
industrial unions. 170 Professor Atleson notes that in 1936 the sit-down
strike was crucial to establishing union recognition in both the rubber
industry and the automobile industry.171 With the constitutionality of the
Act in doubt, the sit-down strike became the most important weapon
industrial unions had in 1936 and 1937. Professor Atleson notes that
"[f]rom September 1936 through May 1937, sit-down strikes directly
involved 484,711 workers and closed plants employing 600,000 others."' 72
Professor Atleson writes that the sit-down strikes "occurred primarily in
unorganized industries, and recognition was the critical goal. The basic
grievance was generally the refusal of employers to observe the NLRA and
engage in collective bargaining."1 73 The sit-down strike succeeded in
bringing the right of collective bargaining to thousands of industrial
workers. 17 4
In Fansteel, however, the Court stripped the workers of the right to
169 Id. at 520-21.
170 In his book, Atleson emphasizes the crucial importance of the sit-down strike as a means to
enforce the promises of the Wagner Act in the mid 1930s. ATLESON, supra note 30, at 45-46. At the
time of the famous General Motors sit-down strikes, which began on December 30, 1936, "[e]very one
of the twenty-four federal judges who had ruled [on the constitutionality of the Wagner Act] agreed that
the Act could not be applied to manufacturing companies." Jim Pope, Worker Lawmaking, Sit-Down
Strikes, and the Shaping of American Industrial Relations, 1935-1958, 24 LAW & HIST. REV. 45, 82
(2006) [hereinafter Worker Lawmaking]. As Professor Pope observes, as long as the constitutionality of
the Wagner Act remained doubtful, "it was clear to unionists that the only way to enforce worker rights
was through strike action." Id. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act on April 12,
1937, by a 5 to 4 vote in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
171 See ATLESON, supra note 30, at 46 (explaining that the rubber workers' sit-down in 1936,
followed by the more well-known sit-downs at General Motors, led to the establishment of union status
in the two industries); see also, MICHAEL J. PIORE & CHARLES F. SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL
DIVIDE: POSSIBILITIES FOR PROSPERITY 97 (1984) (observing that the sit-down strikes of the 1930's
transformed American labor relations from a model based on craft unionism to a model based on
industrial unionism).
172 ATLESON, supra note 30, at 46.
173 Id.
174 Sit-down strikes were especially important in bringing collective bargaining to the automobile,
steel, rubber, and other major industries. See PIORE & SABEL, supra note 171, at 97. As Jeremy Brecher
notes, however, resort to the sit-down strike was by no means limited to factory workers. JEREMY
BRECHER, STRIKE! 208-09 (1972). Waitresses, candy makers, cab drivers, stenographers, retail store
workers, trash collectors, and thousands of others in workplaces of all types engaged in sit-down
strikes; "[t]he range of industries and locations hit by sitdowns was virtually unlimited." Id.
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defend themselves against blatant violations of the law. 175 The Court noted
that there was no doubt that a majority of Fansteel's workers supported the
union. Indeed, 155 of Fansteel's 229 employees had designated the union
as their collective bargaining representative. 7 6 Prior to the strike, union
representatives met twice with Fansteel's superintendent who refused to
bargain with the union about pay, hours, and working conditions on the
grounds that it would never "deal" with an outside union. 7 7 On February
17, 1937, after the second meeting, 95 employees seized two of Fansteel's
buildings.' 78 That evening, the superintendent, accompanied by police
officers and Fansteel's counsel, went to the buildings and demanded that
the employees leave.179 They refused, and Fansteel's counsel announced
that all of the strikers were discharged.180 On February 18, Fansteel
obtained an injunction requiring the strikers to surrender the buildings.181
The strikers again refused to leave, and on February 19 police officers
unsuccessfully attempted to evict the strikers.' 82 The men continued to
occupy Fansteel's buildings until February 26, when sheriffs deputies
finally ousted the strikes and arrested them. 183
Fansteel gradually resumed operations. The Court noted that "[a] large
number of the strikers, including many who had participated in the
occupation of the buildings, were individually solicited to return to work
with back pay but without recognition of the Union."184 Some of the
strikers accepted the offer and returned to work, but others refused to return
to work unless Fansteel would recognize the union. Fansteel hired new
workers to replace the men who remained on strike.185
The union twice requested that management meet with them to discuss
recognition of the union, but Fansteel refused.186 Instead Fansteel created a
company union, the Rare Metal Workers of American, which the NLRB
determined was a part of Fansteel's anti-union strategy.187 The NLRB
175 See How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, supra note 33, at 522 (observing that in
Fansteel, the workers' statutory rights "all but disappeared from consideration").
176 NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 248 (1939).
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 249.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 249-50.
187 Id. at 250.
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found that Fansteel had committed unfair labor practices by interfering
with the employees' right to self-organization and collective bargaining, by
establishing a company union through its domination of the Rare Metal
Workers of America, and by refusing to bargain collectively with the
exclusive representative of the workers.188 The NLRB ordered Fansteel to
bargain collectively with the union and to offer reinstatement with back pay
to all of the workers who went on strike.189 The Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit set aside the NLRB's order,190 and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari on November 21, 193 8.191
The Court agreed with the NLRB that Fansteel had committed unfair
labor practices by isolating the union president from contact with other
workers, by using a labor spy, and by failing to bargain collectively with
the representative of its employees.192 However, the Court held that the
strikers' seizure of Fansteel's buildings gave Fansteel good cause to
dismiss them.193 The Court then proceeded to consider the NLRB's
rationale for ordering reinstatement of the discharged strikers. The NLRB
found that Fansteel's actions had caused the strike, that the employees who
were on strike because of an unfair labor practice retain their status as
employees under the Act, and that ordering reinstatement would serve to
effectuate the policies of the Act. 194 The Court rejected the NLRB's
reasoning, observing that the Act provided a remedy for the employers'
unfair labor practices, namely filing a complaint with the NLRB. The
Court further stated that although Fansteel's conduct was "reprehensible,"
its conduct did not deprive it of its legal right to possession of its
property. 195 The Court observed that:
[T]he fundamental policy of the Act is to safeguard the rights
of self-organization and collective bargaining, and thus by the
promotion of industrial peace to remove obstructions to the
188 Id.
189 Id. at 250-51.
190 Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v. NLRB, 98 F.2d 375, 382 (7th Cir. 1938).
191 NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 305 U.S. 590 (1938) (granting petition for certiorari)
192 NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 251-52 (1939).
193 Id. at 252. The Court called the seizures "a high-handed proceeding without shadow of legal
right" and observed that this conduct gave Fansteel good cause to discharge the strikers "unless the
National Labor Relations Act abrogates the right of the employer to refuse ... his property." Id. As
Professor Atleson has written, the Court's treatment of the sit-down strikes at Fansteel focuses solely on
the employer's status as a property owner and rejects "employee property interest in their jobs or
working conditions." ATLESON, supra note 30, at 45. Hence, the Court's opinion in Fansteel does not
accurately reflect community values because it supports the values of only part of the community, those
of the owners of the means of production. Id.
194 Fansteel, 306 U.S. at 252-53.
195 Id. at 253.
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free flow of commerce as defined in the Act. There is not a
line in the statute to warrant a conclusion that it is any part of
the policies of the Act to encourage employees to resort to
force and violence in defiance of the law of the land. On the
contrary, the purpose of the Act is to promote peaceful
settlements of disputes by providing legal remedies for the
invasions of the employees' rights. 196
Accordingly, the Court held that:
[T]o provide for reinstatement or reemployment of employees
guilty of the acts which the Board finds to have been
committed in this instance would not only not effectuate any
policy of the Act but would directly tend to make abortive its
plan for peaceable procedure. 197
The one-sidedness of the Fansteel decision is striking as the Court focuses
almost exclusively on the wrong done to the employer by the strikers who
interfered with its property rights and gives little or no weight to the wrong
done to the employees by the employer's trampling on their statutory rights
protected by the Act. Moreover, as Professor Pope observes, the Court
substituted its "own judgment for that of Congress as to how commerce
would best be protected" by the Act. 198 Congress had stated in Section 1 of
the Wagner Act that it was "'the policy of the United States to eliminate the
causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce ...
by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-
organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing
.... "'199 Professor Pope goes on to observe that the causes of obstruction
to the free flow of commerce that Congress wanted to eliminate were "the
'denial by some employers of the right of employees to organize and the
refusal by some employers to accept the procedure of collective
bargaining."' 200 Hence, Professor Pope concludes that "whatever else they
were doing-the Fansteel strikers were serving the primary purpose of the
Act by enforcing its guarantee of the right to organize and thereby helping
to 'eliminate the causes' of strikes." 201 The Court's observation that the Act
provided a remedy for the Fansteel strikers ignores the crucial fact that the
NLRB had failed to take action on the employees' unfair labor practice
196 Id. at 257-58.
197 Id. at258.
198 How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, supra note 33, at 523.
199 Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000)).
200 Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 151).
201 Id.
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charges, which had been filed five months prior to the sit-down strike.202
Furthermore, as Professor Pope observes, the Court failed to take into
account that the employer's illegal actions were threatening the union's
very existence.2 03 However, as Professor Pope also points out, the Court's
lack of concern for the employees' statutory rights cannot be blamed
entirely on the Fansteel majority, for the Act itself reduces "workers' rights
to the status of mere means to the end of preventing disruptions to
commerce." 204 While labor leaders had urged Senator Wagner to base the
Act on human rights principles, the senator believed that basing the Act on
Congress' commerce power would strengthen its chances of being held
constitutional.2 05 Nonetheless, framing the Act's main purpose as
preventing disruptions to commerce allowed the courts to strip labor of
some of its most effective weapons, including not only the sit-down strike,
but also slow-downs and other partial strike activities.2 06
If the sit-down strike was analyzed in light of CST principles, what
would be the result? First, it is quite clear that CST does not countenance
violence or destruction of property as means to enforce workers' rights.207
However, as Professor Pope and Jeremy Brecher have demonstrated, the
sit-down strike was not usually characterized by violence or sabotage. On
the contrary, sabotage was condemned, the employer's property protected,
and the strike conducted according to rules democratically enacted by the
strikers.208 Professor Pope observes that:
On the whole, the strikers' legal order appears to have been
effective. "The most astonishing feeling you get in the sit-
down plants is that of ORDER," enthused one striker. "The
plant has been re-administrated." Even hostile observers
confirmed that the strikers maintained orderly, smoothly
202 Id.
203 Id. Professor Pope points out that a traditional strike was what Fansteel was urging through its
labor spy so that Fansteel could replace the striking workers and break their union. Id. He concludes
that "[o]nly by sitting down could the workers prevent the employer from reaping the benefits of its
violations." Id.
204 How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, supra note 33, at 524.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 524-25.
207 See RERUM NOVARUM, supra note 110, 20 (teaching that labor must never injure capital or
resort to violence).
208 See BRECHER, supra note 174, at 182, 194-97 (noting that sit-down strikers opposed sabotage,
protected machinery, and established rules regulating the behavior of the strikers, even creating courts
to punish those who violated the rules); see also Worker Lawmaking, supra note 170, at 81 (observing
that sit-down strikers protected employer property, enacted rules prohibiting sabotage, and "generally
stood ready to evacuate occupied plants on a credible promise by the employer to refrain from re-
starting production until collective bargaining was concluded").
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functioning communities in the plant.209
It is also interesting to note that the strikers defended the sit-down strike
tactic using notions of human rights that are quite comparable to the
Church's teachings on the rights of workers. Professor Pope writes that
many members of the labor movement emphasized that the right to strike
derives from the worker's property right in his or her job.210 The workers'
belief that they had a property interest in their jobs is consistent with CST's
teaching that property rights can be acquired through labor and that the
Church has never held that capitalists' right to private property is "absolute
and untouchable." 211 Hence, the Church does not teach that capitalists have
an absolute property right which would preclude workers from asserting
property rights in their jobs. Pope John Paul II stressed that a capitalist's
property right to the means of production is limited by other Church
teachings:
[The Church] has always understood this right [of ownership
of the means of production] within the broader context of the
right common to all to use the goods of the whole of creation:
the right to private property is subordinated to the right to
common use, to the fact that goods are meant for everyone.2 12
Pope John Paul II also went on to explain that "ownership has never
been understood in a way that could constitute grounds for social conflict
in labour." 2 13 The late Pope explained,
[P]roperty is acquired first of all through work in order that it
may serve work. This concerns in a special way ownership of
the means of production. Isolating these means as a separate
property in order to set it up in the form of "capital" in
opposition to "labour"-and even to practise exploitation of
labour-is contrary to the very nature of these means and their
possession. They cannot be possessed against labour, they
cannot even be possessed for possession's sake, because the
only legitimate title to their possession ... is that they should
serve labour and thus, by serving labour, that they should make
possible ... the universal destination of goods and the right to
209 Worker Lawmaking, supra note 170, at 59.
2 10 Id. at 71 (quoting former UAW president Homer Martin, who wrote that the "right to strike
involves the property right of the worker's job, which is, in our opinion, the most vital property right in
America").
211 LABOEMEXERCENS, supra note 50, 14.
212 Id.
213 Id.
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common use of them.214
In these passages, Pope John Paul II went beyond the sit-down strikers'
assertion of a property right in their jobs to assert a property right in the
means of production. The late Pope stated that "it must immediately be
noted that all [the means of production] are the result of the historical
heritage of human labor." 215 Pope John Paul II's teachings on the priority
of labor, which asserts that the means of production are produced by labor
and for labor supports the sit-down strikers' impassioned assertion of a
property right to their jobs, a position that is consistent with Pope John Paul
II's teaching that one goal of a just economic system is to enable each
worker to be "fully entitled to consider himself a part-owner of the great
workbench at which he is working with everyone else." 216 Hence, CST not
only supports the idea that workers have a property interest in their jobs, it
also supports the idea that workers have a property interest in the means of
production, which labor created and which exist to serve labor.
Defenders of the sit-down strike also argued passionately that the right to
strike is a fundamental human right that trumps employers' property rights.
Homer Martin, president of the United Auto Workers, proclaimed:
Clearly, the issue involved in this whole controversy is
whether or not pure property and profit rights shall supersede
and preclude the consideration of human rights [including] the
inalienable rights of all workers to life, liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness.2 17
As Professor Pope has demonstrated, labor leaders considered the right to
strike as a fundamental human right, grounded in the Thirteenth
Amendment of the Constitution, which prohibits slavery and involuntary
servitude.218 These trade unionists' arguments are remarkably consistent
with the Church's teachings that the rights to form unions and to participate
in union activities without fear of reprisal are fundamental human rights:
Among the basic rights of the human person [must be counted]
the right of freely founding [labor unions]. These [unions]
should be truly able to represent [the workers] and to
contribute to the [proper arrangement] of economic life ....
[Another such right] is the right of freely taking part in the
214 Id. (emphasis omitted).
215 Id. 12 (emphasis omitted).
216 Id. 14.
217 Worker Lawmaking, supra note 170, at 71.
218 Id. at 69.
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activity of these unions without risk of reprisal.219
Because the Church recognizes as a fundamental human right the right to
form unions that are truly able to represent the workers, the Church has
also taught that workers have the right to strike. 220
However, does the fundamental human right to strike which CST
recognizes include recourse, in extreme circumstances, to civil
disobedience, such as the sit-down strike? The Church's answer appears to
be "yes" in some cases because a strike is an effective tool for promoting
the fundamental human right to organize only when a strike can succeed in
stopping production. Labor unionists in the 1930s argued that for low-
skilled industrial workers to wage an effective strike, only a sit-down strike
could be effective. Professor Pope explains:
Why was the sit-down necessary to make the right to strike
effective? Because a strike could succeed only by stopping
production, and the only [legal] way for unskilled workers-
who could easily be replaced-to halt production was the mass
picket line, which was too vulnerable to suppression. "Should
a worker leave his job behind and depart from a plant and his
skill is not such that his absence stops production," explained
one union journal, "then the corporation brings in guards,
strike-breakers, poison gas and machine guns." With the
picket line broken, the "strikers are just men out of jobs" and
the "strike staggers on awhile, collapses and the union dies...
."221
Hence, union leaders argued, the sit-down became necessary as a result of
the weakness of the traditional strike. Therefore, the sit-down strike was
not a "novel and radical tactic," but an incremental response to changed
conditions; it was the transfer of the picket line into the plant.22 2
These arguments for the sit-down strike are not inconsistent with the
Church's teachings on labor unions and strikes. The Church does not
affirm merely the abstract right to form worker associations; it affirms the
right to form associations that are able "to secure their rights to fair wages
219 GAUDIUMETSPESsupra note 110, 68.
220 See LABOREM EXERCENS, supra note 50, 100 (stating that the Church recognizes the right to
strike "as legitimate in the proper conditions and within just limits"); see also Social Doctrine, supra
note 13, at 304 (noting that the Church recognizes the legitimacy of the strike "when it cannot be
avoided, or at least when it is necessary to obtain a proportionate benefit" (quoting CATECHISM OF THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 49, T 2435 (1994))).
221 Worker Lawmaking, supra note 170, at 70.
222 Id.
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and working conditions." 223 It is the right to form effective labor unions
that the Church acknowledges. Just as the union leaders of the 1930s
rejected the "absurd and futile proposition that a working man's right to
strike means nothing more than his right to give up his job to a scab, '224 the
Church teaches that the right to strike is justified only when it is effective,
that is, when it is a means that can secure the justice owed to workers. 225 It
is not an abstract right to organize that the Church proclaims to be a
fundamental human right, but the right to organize workers' associations
that can affect justice for workers. The arguments that union leaders made
to justify the sit-down strike are, in general, consistent with CST. If the
facts of Fansteel were analyzed using the principles of CST, I believe the
sit-down strike would have been found a legitimate means for workers to
effect their human right to organize labor unions with the power to
adequately "secure their rights to fair wages and working conditions." 226
The Fansteel decision and its implications for workers' right to defend
themselves have a continuing relevance in our time. As Professor Pope
points out, Fansteel is one of the key Supreme Court decisions that help to
explain the decline of the American labor movement.227 Moreover, there
are similarities between the challenges workers faced in the 1930s and the
challenges they face today. We know from the work of Freeman and
Rogers that employees today want power and influence at the workplace as
much as their counterparts in the 1930s. 2 28 However, American workers
continue to face fierce employer opposition to unionization. The renowned
labor law scholar Derek Bok observed long ago that while employers in
most economically advanced countries eventually came to accept the idea
of bargaining collectively with their workers, American employers have
not only refused to accept collective bargaining but have been fierce
223 ECONOMICJUSTICEFOR ALL, supra note 12, 1 104.
224 Worker Lawmaking, supra note 170, at 69 (quoting A.F. Whitney of the Railroad Trainmen
union).
225 See ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 12, 104.
226 Id.
227 See Worker Lawmaking, supra note 33, at 551-53 (arguing that Fansteel is one of a small
number of important decisions that were barely noticed at the time they were decided but which had a
significance that has been magnified by social and economic changes such that they have led to the
ossification of American labor law).
228 See FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 3, at 41. Freeman and Rogers reported that 63% of
American workers would like to have more influence at work. Id. They found that 44% of private sector
workers in the United States would like to be represented by a union. Id. at 89. Furthermore, a majority
of workers want to be represented at the workplace by an organization with some authority that is
independent of management and want workplace decisions to be jointly decided by labor and
management, with disputes referred to an outside arbitrator. Id. at 59.
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opponents of it.229 As unions grow weaker and easier to attack, employer
opposition to unions and to collective bargaining grows even stronger.
Professor Lance Compa has observed that "[fliring or otherwise
discriminating against a worker for trying to form a union is illegal but
commonplace in the United States." 230 Freeman and Rogers found in their
survey of managers that most would oppose any unionization effort, and
most managers said it would hurt their careers a great deal if their
employees successfully unionized. 231 Anti-union employers have available
to them the anti-union consultant industry, which often recommends that
employers resort to illegal tactics to thwart unionization drives.232
Consequently, Professor Dannin writes, "[t]he use of illegal campaign
tactics is now so widespread that every twenty-three minutes, a worker is
fired or discriminated against for attempting to exercise his or her freedom
of association." 233
The weakness and growing irrelevance of American labor law is making
such employer lawlessness possible. Professor Compa, writing about
widespread illegal discrimination against union supporters, notes that an
employer who fires a union organizer has little to fear:
An employer determined to get rid of a union activist knows
that all that awaits, after years of litigation if the employer
persists in appeals, is a reinstatement order the worker is likely
to decline and a modest back-pay award. For many employers,
it is a small price to pay to destroy a workers' organizing drive
by firing its leaders. 234
As Professor Estlund has observed, the paltry remedies for employees
whose rights have been violated and the long delays in the enforcement of
employees' rights have led many employers to "realize they have little to
fear from labor law enforcement through a ponderous, delay-ridden legal
229 Derek C. Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character ofAmerican Labor Laws, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 1394, 1409-11 (1971). Professor Bok, writing at a time when unions still had a great deal of
strength, noted that American employers continued defiantly to oppose collective bargaining and noted
that "[t]housands of cases are brought each year alleging the firing of employees for engaging in union
activities . I.." Id. at 1410.
230 Lance Compa, Workers' Freedom ofAssociation in the United States: The Gap Between Ideals
and Practice, in WORKERS' RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 23, 33 (observing that in "the
1990s more than 20,000 workers each year were victims of discrimination" for participating in union
activities).
231 FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 3, at 62 (noting that three-fourths of managers would rather
discuss workplace problems individually rather than in groups).
232 DANNIN, supra note 9, at ix (commenting that the push to suppress unionization by employers
is met "without fear of reprisal").
233 Id.
234 Compa, supra note 230, at 33-34.
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system with meager remedial powers." 235
In summary, the Wagner Act's weakness, particularly its inability to
address illegal employer activities that violate workers' statutory rights, has
resulted in the Wagner Act's becoming "distorted and dysfunctional, if not
irrelevant, for most employees." 236 Hence, in the early twenty-first century,
workers find themselves in a situation similar to workers in the early to
middle-1930s with declining union membership, hostile employers, and
weak laws that do little to protect them. Nonetheless, a majority of workers
still want an effective voice in the workplace. 237 With labor law ossified
and with virtually no hope of meaningful labor law reform in the near
future, today's workers, like their sisters and brothers in the 1930s, will
have to resort to self-help. Furthermore, it is likely that the traditional
strike will not be a major component in a self-help approach. Professor
Estlund has written that the Mackay decision "has rendered the strike
useless and virtually suicidal for many employees." 238 Indeed, Professor
Pope has written that the Mackay permanent replacement doctrine has
effected
[A] bizarre reversal of the strike's traditional function.
Although the strike is legally protected so that it can provide
workers with a source of bargaining power, it now serves as a
source of employer bargaining power. According to a recent
study of collective bargaining negotiations, employers are now
more likely to threaten permanent replacement than unions are
to threaten a strike.239
235 Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 1527,
1588-89 (2002) [hereinafter Ossification] (discussing how the law's weakness enables employers to
frustrate workers' rights to organize, bargain, and strike).
236 Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105
COLUM. L. REv. 319, 402 (2005). Professor Estlund contrasts the growing irrelevance of labor law and
the rapid expansion of what is commonly known as employment law. Id. Professor Estlund argues that
the individual rights that characterize employment law are "a poor substitute for the system of self-
governance envisioned by the labor laws." Id.
237 See FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 3, at 41 (illustrating that 63 percent of workers surveyed
report that they want more influence at the workplace); see also MORRIS, supra note 3, at 8 (observing
that recent polling reports indicate that 50 percent of nonunion workers would vote for a union if they
had the opportunity).
238 Ossification, supra note 235, at 1538.
239 How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, supra note 33, at 527-28 (citing Joel Cutcher-
Gershenfeld, The Social Contract at the Bargaining Table: Evidence from a National Survey of Labor
and Management Negotiators, in INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION SERIES,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 51ST ANNUAL MEETING 214, 216-19 (Paula B. Voos ed., rev. vol. 1999). See
Geral E. Berendt et al., Fourth Annual Arthur J. Goldberg Conference: The Labor Strike: Is It Still a
Useful Economic Weapon For Unions?, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 255, 262-63 (2002) The author notes:
[B]oth history and contemporary experience in the United States and elsewhere suggest [that]
the strike as an isolated tactic is very problematic .... The institutional framework that, for a
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With the traditional strike perversely transformed into a weapon for
employers to break worker organizations, workers will be forced to win
recognition of their organizations and promote the basic human right of
collective bargaining by resorting to tactics that are either illegal or, at best,
of questionable legality, much like the workers who waged sit-down strikes
in the 1930s. Workers, in short, will have to engage in civil disobedience,
as African Americans did in the 1960s to destroy the evil of segregation. A
recent example of a union using civil rights tactics with encouraging results
is the Service Employees International Union's (SEIU) Justice for Janitors
campaign. Vanessa Tait has called the Justice for Janitors campaign one of
the largest and most confrontational organizing efforts of recent times.2 40
Bypassing the NLRA's ineffective procedures, the SEIU "turned to time-
tested social movement strategies-including sit-ins, militant
demonstrations, and civil disobedience-that physically interfered with
employers' ability to conduct business." 241
Allying themselves with civil rights and community activists, Justice for
Janitors organized highly effective demonstrations of civil disobedience.
For example:
In Washington, DC, janitors blocked a major bridge and held
class in the streets to protest educational cuts. In November
1990 they chained themselves to the headquarters of the city's
wealthiest developer and in March 1995 occupied city council
offices to protest a real estate tax break. The tax reduction
would have devastated social programs for the poor while
benefiting big developers, including one who had resisted the
union's attempts to organize its buildings. "This isn't just
about 5,000 janitors; it's about issues that concern all D.C.
residents-what's happening to their schools, their streets,
their neighborhoods," a union leader told the Washington
Post. 242
SEIU's willingness to break out of the constraints of the NLRA proved
highly effective. Tait writes:
few decades, supported the standard scenario strike in a few key industries has virtually
disappeared, except for rules that handicap workers and unions.
Id. See Finkin, supra note 29, at 567. For many employees, resorting to the strike would be "an exercise
in permanent job loss, and, for the union, an act of potential self-immolation." Id.
240 VANESSA TAIT, POOR WORKERS' UNIONS: REBUILDING LABOR FROM BELOW 188 (2005). One
of the largest and most confrontational trade union organizing efforts was SEIU's Justice for Janitors
campaign. Id.
241 Id.
242 Id. at 189.
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By 1995, Justice for Janitors had won contract battles in Los
Angeles, Washington, DC, and Denver, and had become the
most successful organizing campaign among private sector
service workers in decades, bringing 35,000 new members into
SEIU.243
Professor Pope has observed that SEIU's success reflected the lessons of
history in two prior occasions when the labor movement had enjoyed great
success by going outside of the boundaries of the law: once in the 1930s
with sympathy strikes, city-wide boycotts, mass picketing, and sit-down
strikes, and again in the 1960s when public employees engaged in
successful strikes despite laws prohibiting them from striking.244 Like
private sector workers in the 1930s and public employees in the 1960s,
Justice for Janitors achieved sensational results by "seeking to resolve
issues outside the legal system to the extent possible." 245 Although
workers' willingness to go outside the law to promote basic human rights
might be disturbing, it is nonetheless true that:
It is in disorder that workers experience and exercise their
power in the production process. The entire history of the
labor movement is a history of workers creating "disorder"-
strikes, disruptions of production, picketing-in order to
achieve unionization and to better their working conditions. 246
The rebirth of the labor movement will depend in large part on labor's
ability to create disorder and to act outside the constraints of current law.247
243 Id.
244 How American Workers, supra note 33 at 547 (noting that SEIU emulated civil disobedience
protest methods from the 1930s and 1960s).
245 Id. (emphasizing SEIU's encouragement of public officials to support their cause rather than
facing the legal issue on its face).
246 Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J.
1509, 1565 (1981). The need for workers to resort to disorder to obtain their right to organize and
bargain collectively exposes a possible contradiction in CST, which both acknowledges the right of
workers to form workers' associations, but also insists that labor and capital "should exist in harmony
and agreement, and should, as it were, fit into one another, so as to maintain the equilibrium of the body
politic." RERUM NOVARUM, supra note 110, 15. Although Pope Leo XIII wrote these words in 1891,
the Church continues to teach that "[t]he relationships between capital and labour must be characterized
by cooperation." Social Doctrine, supra note 13, at 91. Yet the Church also teaches that the right to
assemble and form workers' associations is a fundamental right based on the "nature of the human
person and on his transcendent dignity." Id. at 301. The practical necessity of creating "disorder" to
realize this fundamental right reveals a fundamental tension between the Church's teaching that basic
workers rights are fundamental rights and the Church's teaching that labor and management relations
should be cooperative. While a large degree of cooperation between labor and capital is possible, the
hostility of American employers to unions and collective bargaining and the fact that collective
bargaining will always, to some extent, be an adversarial process make it unlikely that labor and capital
will achieve the ideal of cooperation found in the encyclicals. For workers to win their rights, there will
have to be confrontation, as well as cooperation.
247 See How American Workers, supra note 33, at 545 (stating that the labor movement cannot be
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Professor Pope has noted that twice before the labor movement faced
"conditions at least as daunting as today's: once around the turn of the
century and once in the 1930s."248 In both instances the labor movement
succeeded by "going outside the boundaries of the law."249 Among the
tactics employed were sympathy strikes, city-wide boycotts, mass
picketing, and sit-down strikes.2 50 Although tactics like mass picketing and
sit-down strikes might seem like relics from the industrial age with little
relevance for post-industrial America, one must realize that the majority of
employees in the United States continue to be "working class." Professor
Michael Zweig writes:
The great majority of Americans form the working class. They
are skilled and unskilled, in manufacturing and in services,
men and women of all races, nationalities, religions. They
drive trucks, write routine computer code, operate
machinery... sort and deliver the mail, work on assembly
lines, stand all day as bank tellers, perform thousands of jobs
in every sector of the economy. For all their differences,
working class people share a common place in production,
where they have relatively little control over the pace and
content of their work, and aren't anybody's boss.... When we
add them all up, they account for over 60 percent of the labor
force.251
Furthermore, although the sit-down strike was a key tactic for industrial
workers, many non-industrial workers resorted to this tactic, including
clerical workers, laundry workers, hotel employees, waitresses, candy
makers, cab drivers, stenographers, tailors, department store workers,
garbage collectors, hospital maintenance workers, grave diggers,
draftsmen, and engineers.2 52 The wide range of workers who successfully
employed the sit-down strike in the 1930s suggests that today's workers in
the post-industrial economy could also successfully employ this tactic to
enforce the basic human right of freedom of association and collective
bargaining.
revived within the constraints of the current law).
248 Id. at 547.
249 Id.
250 Id. (noting that in the 1960s public worker unions won spectacular victories by "systematically
conducting strikes in the face of public employee strike bans").
251 MICHAEL ZWEIG, THE WORKING CLASS MmoRITY: AMERICA'S BEST KEPT SECRET 3 (2000).
252 BRECHER, supra note 174, at 208-11 (noting the breadth of non-industrial workers who used
the sit-down strike, a tactic traditionally employed by industrial workers, to achieve their labor
demands).
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Whether or not the sit-down strike would be a useful weapon in the
twenty-first century, it is likely, given the ineffectiveness of the traditional
strike, that workers will have to resort to more effective strategies to
enforce their rights. Some of these strategies will include tactics that are
not currently protected by the Act, such as reviving the secondary boycott
weapon,253 and resorting to tactics like slowdowns, partial strikes, and
"quickie" or intermittent strikes.254 The necessity of employing pressure
tactics other than the traditional strike reflects the fact that "the world for
which the Wagner Act was designed has ceased to exist."255 As Professor
Bellace has written:
The Wagner Act was designed to regulate labor relations in an
industrial economy, one that produced almost exclusively for a
domestic market.... The examples used by members of
Congress and the newspaper accounts of the day also indicate
that the picture Congress had in mind [when it passed the
Wagner Act] was that of a male, blue-collar worker most often
working in a factory.256
Professor Bellace notes that, following the deindustrialization of the 1970s
and 1980s, "fewer workers were employed in jobs where striking [was]
useful." 257 Furthermore, technological changes have made it possible for
253 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (2000) (including a broad prohibition on appeals to the employees of
so-called neutral employers to support workers who are involved in a labor dispute under § 8(b)(4) and
limiting appeals to customers of neutral employers); see also CRAVER, supra note 15, at 145-46
(arguing that Congress should amend the Act to permit some forms of secondary activity); see also
Getman, supra note 31, at 140 (asserting that the secondary boycott prohibitions in the Act should be
found unconstitutional as violations of employees' First Amendment right to free speech); see also Ken
Matheny & Marion Crain, Making Labor's Rhetoric Reality, 5 GREEN BAG 2d 17, 24-25 (2001)
(stating that the secondary boycott prohibitions should be eliminated because of their questionable
constitutionality and because they "deprive workers of essential leverage in balancing power between
employers and workers"); see also How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, supra note 33, at
555 (discussing the International Labor Organization's holding that the Act's ban on secondary boycotts
violates workers' freedom of association); see also St. Antoine, supra note 14, at 653 (asserting that
prohibitions on secondary activity should be lifted in particular situations such as organizing, "where
union need is greatest"); see also Katherine V.w. Stone, The Kenneth M. Piper Lecture: Employee
Representation in the Boundaryless Workplace, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 773, 818 (2002) (recommending
that section 8(b)(4) of the Act should be repealed and that unions should be allowed to engage in
peaceful secondary activity).
254 See Craig Becker, "Better Than a Strike": Protecting New Forms of Collective Work
Stoppages Under the National Labor Relations Act, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 351, 368-69 (1994) (describing
partial and intermittent strikes, and the advantages of an intermittent strike for a labor union); see also
Ken Matheny & Marion Crain, Law, Loyalty, and Treason: How Can the Law Regulate Loyalty Without
Imperiling It?: Disloyal Workers and the "Un-American " Labor Law, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1705, 1726-29
(2004) (discussing case law wherein courts found nontraditional worker tactics violated workers' "duty
of loyalty" to their employers).
255 Bellace, supra note 32, at 13.
256 Id. at 13.
257 Id. at 19.
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many companies to operate during a strike.258 Also, in the growing service
sector of the economy, workers are often aware that if they go on strike,
there will be minimal impact on their employers. 259 If it is true, as
Professor Stone has argued, that it is through disorder that workers win and
exercise their basic right to bargain collectively with their employers, then
it is likely that workers will have to choose tactics that lie outside of the
protections of the NLRA.
If the rebirth of the labor movement does indeed require workers to
employ tactics that are not protected by the law, what should the Church's
position be regarding these tactics? Clearly, the Church cannot and should
not support violence or damage to property. The Church has always
opposed class warfare and has rightly taught that labor and capital can
cooperate peacefully. 260  Nonetheless, American business's fierce
opposition to organized labor reveals that class warfare unfortunately exists
and is usually waged from the top. Determined employer resistance to the
Wagner Act began well before it was signed into law. Professor Melvyn
Dubofsky describes the unanimous employer opposition to the Wagner Act
in the 1930s:
[E]mployers without exception [fought] the Wagner Act before
and after its passage. If there was a single "corporate liberal"
anywhere in the American business universe willing to
embrace either the new law or accommodative labor leaders,
that person never testified before the Senate and House
committees... in 1934 and 1935. Between March 1934, when
Wagner first introduced his legislation, and July 1935, when it
became law, corporate America united against it. When
Roosevelt signed the Wagner Act, the employers did not
withdraw from the field of battle. 261
258 Id. at 19-20.
259 Id. at 20.
260 See RERUM NOVARUM, supra note 110, 15 (articulating the view that employers and
employees can cooperate peacefully by observing that labor cannot do without capital and capital
cannot do without labor, and rejecting class conflict); see also Social Doctrine, supra note 13, at 306
(stating that the social doctrine states that cooperation is an essential element of work relationships).
261 MELVYN DUBOFSKY, THE STATE AND LABOR IN MODERN AMERICA 130 (University of North
Carolina Press 1994) (explaining that over the decades the fierce business opposition to labor unions
remained strong); see Bok, supra note 229, at 1410 (describing how, 36 years after the passage of the
Wagner Act, employers continued to put up a determined resistance to workers' right to unionize, and
thousands of cases were brought each year before the NLRB alleging that employers had dismissed
workers for their support of unions); see also CRAVER, supra note 15, at 49 (observing, among other
things, that by the late 1980s, unlawful terminations occurred in one out of every three Labor Board
elections); see also DANNN, supra note 9, at ix (pointing out that the use of illegal campaign tactics has
become so common that a worker is either fired or discriminated against every twenty-three minutes for
attempting to exercise his or her freedom of association).
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Indeed, employers have continued to wage a bitter war against workers'
rights that continues to this day. 262 While the Church should continue to
insist on the necessity of class cooperation, her position on workers'
employing tactics not protected by the Wagner Act to promote their
fundamental rights at work must acknowledge that class conflict has
existed for decades in America whenever employees attempt to unionize. 263
Failing to recognize the reality of class conflict over American workers'
right to organize would weaken the force of the Church's teachings by
removing them from reality.264 Nor should the Church fail to acknowledge
that at times conflict is necessary and just. Indeed, as Donal Dorr has
argued, "confrontation may at times be compatible with Christian faith, and
even demanded by it.'' 265
Furthermore, the Church's powerful statements regarding workers'
rights to form unions and to bargain with their employers support the view
that CST should endorse the use of peaceful tactics to make these rights
available to all workers who desire them even if the tactics are not
protected by current American labor law. The forcefulness of the Church's
teachings on workers' rights can hardly be exaggerated. For example, the
U.S. Catholic Bishops have proclaimed that "[n]o one may deny the right
to organize without attacking human dignity itself."266 Furthermore, the
Second Vatican Council clearly stated, "[a]mong the basic rights of the
human person must be counted the right of freely founding labor
unions." 267 Moreover, the Church has long taught that love for the poor and
the powerless is at the heart of CST.268 Support for a stronger labor
262 Cf. supra note 259 (explaining that workers' unions continue to struggle against employers for
the well-being of workers).
263 Professor Bok noted that America is unique in the Western world in that employers in this
country have never come to acknowledge the legitimacy of unions and the right to collective
bargaining. Bok, supra note 229, at 1409-11. Professor Bok observed that in Europe, an overwhelming
majority of employers eventually came to accept collective bargaining, while in the United States,
resistance to unions and collective bargaining has remained strong. Id. Indeed the tactics used by many
employers to resist unionization reveal that it is no exaggeration to characterize employer resistance as
class warfare. See Roy J. Adams, Voice for All: Why the Right to Refrain from Collective Bargaining Is
No Right At All, in WORKERS' RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 142. Adams discussed a
report by Human Rights Watch that many American workers who try to form unions are "spied on,
harassed, pressured, threatened, suspended, fired, deported, or otherwise victimized in reprisal for their
exercise of their right to freedom of association." Id. at 148.
264 The U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops implicitly recognized the reality of class conflict
concerning the right to unionize when it called for labor law reform to address employers' efforts to
break unions and to prevent workers from organizing. ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 12,
104.
265 DORR, supra note 110, at 202 (emphasis added).
266 ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 12, 104.
267 GAUDIUMETSPES, supra note 110, 68.
268 See ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 12, 260 (teaching that "the preferential option
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movement is one of the most effective ways of enhancing the economic
and political position of the poor and disadvantaged. As Richard Freeman
and James Medoff observed in their classic study What Do Unions Do?,
unions have achieved their greatest political victories on social legislation
that has benefited all workers, whether unionized or not, and in the process
contributed to greater economic equality.269 In addition, unions have been
of central importance to providing political clout for the poor.270 For
example, unions were strong supporters of President Lyndon Johnson's
Great Society reforms, which resulted in the "broadest expansion of the
American welfare state since its inception during the New Deal." 271 That
unions remain deeply committed to promoting the interests of the working
poor is evident in AFL-CIO president John Sweeney's statement that the
labor movement must continue to represent all "working people throughout
the society - union members and nonmembers alike." 272 As Vanessa Tait
has observed, for decades progressive trade unionists have advanced the
vision of social justice unionism which has championed the causes of the
poor and the powerless in our society. 273 Indeed, as a practical matter, the
Church's preferential option for the poor requires a strong commitment to
rebuilding the American labor movement. It has long been known that
there is a strong correlation between a strong labor movement and "the
maintenance of low unemployment, a progressive distribution of income,
and high expenditures for domestic social programs." 274 Moreover, the
transition to a services-based economy in the U.S. provides opportunities
for a revitalized labor movement to help the poorest workers, most of
for the poor is the central priority for policy choice").
269 RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 18-19 (1984) (arguing
that based on a wide variety of data and interviews with labor experts, there is ample evidence that
unions have had very positive effects on the working class and on general economic and political
freedoms).
270 Id. at 202 (noting that unions have achieved "their main political success[es] ... as the voice of
workers and the lower income segments of society").
271 DUBOFSKY, supra note 261, at 226.
272 JOHN J. SWEENEY & DAVID KUSNET, AMERICA NEEDS A RAISE: FIGHTING FOR ECONOMIC
SECURITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 106 (1996). The labor movement's importance as a political force that
promotes a broad agenda based on social justice, as opposed to being just another special interest group,
is illustrated by labor's strong support for all of the civil rights acts and for important social legislation,
such as Medicare. See ARTHUR B. SHOSTAK, ROBUST UNIONISM: INNOVATIONS IN THE LABOR
MOVEMENT 177 (1991).
273 See TAIT, supra note 240, at 8-9 (discussing the broad commitment to justice and the
redistribution of power at the heart of social justice unionism).
274 THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL, THE NEW POLITICS OF INEQUALITY 235 (1984) (discussing the
effects of strong labor movements in Western European countries); see ROBERT KUTTNER,
EVERYTHING FOR SALE: THE VIRTUES AND LIMITS OF MARKETS 100 (1997) (describing unions as one
of society's most potent counterweights to the inequalities generated by markets and maintaining that
unions are "a force for greater equality, because they promote[] a more egalitarian distribution of
earnings").
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whom have jobs in the local service economy, which means that their jobs
will not be shipped overseas if employers had to pay higher wages. 275 The
preferential option for the poor is at the heart of CST, and this love for the
poor requires strong support for the labor movement and advancing the
rights of workers. Hence, I argue that the Church should strongly support
all peaceful attempts by workers to form unions, even when some of the
tactics employed might not be protected, or might even be proscribed, by
the Act.
CONCLUSION: TEMPLES OF THE HOLY GHOST
CST has made a valuable and powerful contribution to our
comprehension of the deeper dimensions that underlie the complexities of
American labor law. The Church has strongly endorsed workers' freedom
of association as a basic human right, the protection of which is
indispensable for a just society. CST's keen interest in the rights of
workers reflects its understanding that human work is "the key to the entire
social question." 276 While CST has made a profound contribution to labor
law theory by its strong stand that workers' right to organize is a basic
human right, at an even deeper level, the Church has made the most
profound contribution possible to understanding the true meaning of
workers' rights through its teaching that workers' rights are grounded on
the most important theological and moral truths about the human person.
The renowned Catholic philosopher, Jacques Maritain, who observed that
the rights of the working person are ultimately of the greatest moral
significance, perhaps best expressed the moral nature of work:
What is involved in all this is first of all the dignity of work,
the feeling for the rights of the human person in the worker,
the rights in the name of which the worker stands before his
employer in a relationship of justice and as an adult person, not
as a child or as a servant. There is here an essential datum
which far surpasses every problem of merely economic and
social technique, for it is a moral datum, affecting man in his
spiritual depths.277
Ultimately, labor law implicates profound theological issues, issues which
were seen clearly by Dorothy Day, founder of the Catholic Worker
275 ROBERT B. REICH, I'LL BE SHORT: ESSENTIALS FOR A DECENT WORKING SOCIETY 56 (2002)
(discussing the potential for unions to assist the working poor).
276 Social Doctrine, supra note 13, at 101.
277 JACQUES MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE 105 (1951).
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movement, a woman who devoted her life to bringing CST into a daily,
practical encounter with working people. For Dorothy Day, workers'
struggles to assert and defend the dignity conferred on them by their status
as workers expressed the "fundamental truth that men should be treated not
as chattels, but as human beings, as 'temples of the Holy Ghost.'"278 At the
deepest level, I would argue, CST's most important contribution to the
future of American labor law is to remind us that when God took on human
form and took up the trade of a carpenter, everything changed, and the true
nobility of work was for all time revealed. In the twenty-first century, one
hopes, America will create a labor law that is worthy of the true dignity of
workers.
278 DOROTHY DAY, Our Stand on Strikes, in BY LrrTLE AND BY LITTLE: THE SELECTED
WRITINGS OF DOROTHY DAY 241, 241 (Robert Ellsberg ed., 1983).
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